Unions and the Southern Courts: Part II--Violence and Injunctions in Southern Labor Disputes by Petro, Sylvester
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 59 | Number 5 Article 3
6-1-1981
Unions and the Southern Courts: Part II--Violence
and Injunctions in Southern Labor Disputes
Sylvester Petro
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sylvester Petro, Unions and the Southern Courts: Part II--Violence and Injunctions in Southern Labor Disputes, 59 N.C. L. Rev. 867
(1981).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol59/iss5/3
UNIONS AND THE SOUTHERN COURTS:




I. VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTHERN LABOR CASES ..................... 869
A. Picketing in the Southern Courts ............................ 870
B. "Unfair" Signs and Name-Calling in the Southern Courts .... 875
C. Outright Violence in the Southern Courts .................... 878
II. THE LABOR INJUNCTION IN THE SOUTHERN COURTS ............ 885
A. General Summary of the Southern Labor Injunction Cases ... 886
B. The Southern Courts' Views on the Propriety of Injunctive
Relief in Labor Disputes and on the Preemption Doctrine .... 890
C. Equity Procedures and Practices in the Southern Courts:
Injunctions as "Strike-Defeating" Measures ................. 894
1. Interlocutory Relief and Labor Disputes ................ 894
2. Equity Principle in the Labor Cases, North and South .. 901
D. Contempt in the Southern Labor-Injunction Cases ........... 905
III. FINAL CONCLUSIONS ........................................... 907
TABLE:
1. GENERAL SUMMARY OF 186 LABOR-INJUNCTION
CA SES ......................................................... 910
UNIONS AND THE SOUTHERN COURTS:
PART II-VIOLENCE AND INJUNCTIONS IN
SOUTHERN LABOR DISPUTES
SYLVESTER PETROt
In this Article, the second installment of a series that began earlier
in this volume, Professor Petro continues his examination of the south-
ern labor cases in an attempt to evaluate the common charge that un-
ions have suffered in the South because of institutional anti-unionism,
including judicial bias. The focus of this installment is on procedures
and remedies, with emphasis on the southern response to union violence.
After examining the various forms of oppressive union activity, Profes-
sorPetro explores the development of the equityprinciple and the use of
the labor injunction in the southern courts. Professor Petrofinally con-
cludes that there is no evidence that the southern courts displayed an
anti-union animus, in fact, he claims, the southern courts often dis-
playedpro-union tendencies in many areas.
We continue here the effort begun in the first installment of this Article to
evaluate the belief that unions have not done as well in the South as they
should have done and that the reason for this supposedly poor performance
has lain in institutional anti-unionism, particularly in the southern courts.I In
the first part we compared the principles applied by southern judges to com-
pulsory unionism agreements,2 picketing,3 and other varieties of "secondary
boycotts"'4 with those prevailing in the northern courts. We concluded that in
these substantive areas there was no evidence in the cases that southern judges
were more anti-union than their northern colleagues. On the contrary, the
cases revealed the southern judges sharing the views of the most "liberal"
(pro-union) northern courts. Whenever there was a "liberal"-"conservative"
split, the southern courts were far more likely to reflect the views of the "lib-
eral" New York Court of Appeals than those of the "conservative" Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court.5
t Member of the Illinois Bar. A.B. 1943 and J.D. 1945, University of Chicago, L.L.M.
1950, University of Michigan. Director, The Institute for Law and Policy Analysis, Winston-
Salem, N.C.; formerly professor of law at various universities. Author, THE LABOR POLICY OF
THE FREE SOCIETY (1957) and other books and articles. I would like to thank Mr. Geoffrey Man-
gum, Esq., of the North Carolina Bar for his assistance in collecting the southern cases.
I. See Petro, Unions and the Southern Courts.: Part 1-Boycotts in the Southern Courts, 59
N.C.L. REv. 99 (1980).
2. Id. at 107-12.
3. Id. at 112-21.
4. Id. at 121-42.
5. For an examination of the paradoxes and contradictions of this "Iiberal"-"conservative"
terminology, see id. at 107, 109-10, 127, 142. However, the habit of identifying "liberalism" with
the syndicalist pro-unionism of the New York Court of Appeals in the period 1900-1950 and
"conservatism" with the passion for personal freedom and against monopoly evident in almost all
members of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Courts, except Justice Holmes, in the first third
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In contrast to the concentration on substantive law in the first installment,
this one focuses mainly on procedures and remedies; but it is nonetheless of at
least equal significance. Violence is unlawful everywhere in this country, in
the South as well as in the North. However, judicial opinion differs widely on
what constitutes violence, and it differs still more widely, within given jurisdic-
tions as well as between different jurisdictions, 6 as to when or whether equita-
ble relief is proper. It may reasonably be argued that no labor-law issues are
more important than those concerning the availability of injunctive relief in
violent labor disputes. Pro-union or anti-union bias is more likely to show up,
I believe, in judicial tendencies to grant or withhold prompt injunctive relief in
labor disputes than anywhere else. In a sense, then, Section II of this install-
ment is the climactic feature of the series. However, I do not present it, or the
series, as complete and definitive studies in themselves. They are part of a
larger project, one designed to examine exhaustively the legal history and
background of current national labor policy.7
Since it is not easy to summarize the conclusions to which my reading of
the southern labor cases has led me, I leave them to the end of this Article.
However, a decision on the charge that southern judges have been motivated
by anti-union animus is easy: the evidence does not sustain the charge.
I. VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTHERN LABOR CASES
A relatively undeveloped region prior to 1930, the South had few large-
scale employment units and, therefore, few large-scale labor disputes (before
1930) of the kind in which violence is likely to develop. As a result, in order to
collect a sufficient number of cases with which to evaluate the approaches of
the southern courts to union violence, it has been necessary to expand research
into the more recent cases. We have come up to date in North Carolina and
Texas in order to see how one of the least organized 8 and one of the more
heavily organized 9 of the southern states have dealt with labor violence.
Picketing by unions has caused all American courts considerable trouble,
mainly because of its ambiguous character: it does double duty, both as a
mixed form of intimidation and as a communication, alerting friendly mem-
of this century, is now so ingrained among most teachers of labor law that communication would
be impaired rather than promoted by using more precise and less contradictory terminology. For
one of the sources of the current confusion, see C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 52-82 (1st ed.
1946).
6. See section II. C. infra.
7. See Petro, Injunctions and Labor Disputes: 1880-1932, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341
(1978).
8. South Carolina appears to be the least organized of the states, with 8.9% of its nonagricul-
tural labor force belonging to trade unions or other employee associations. But there have been so
few labor cases in South Carolina that we have chosen North Carolina for illustrative purposes.
North Carolina has 10.7% of its nonagricultural labor force organized. See U.S. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2079, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS AND
EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS, 1979, at 72, Table 19 (1980).
9. The most heavily organized of the southern states, Alabama, with 24.6% of its nonagri-
cultural labor force organized, had relatively little labor litigation, at least compared with Texas,
with 13.3% of its nonagricultural labor force organized. See id.
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bers of other unions to their "duty" to boycott offending employers.10 We
start our review of the southern labor violence cases with those involving pick-
eting, and go on from there to the libel, slander, name-calling, intimidation,
and finally the outright violence cases. Evaluation of the common belief that
the southern courts have been harder on unions than the northern courts has
been postponed until after the cases have been presented.
A. Picketing in the Southern Courts
In the first part of this Article, we considered picketing in its "signal"
aspect-as a form of boycott inducement-and found that on the whole the
southern courts considered it privileged if it was peaceable.I Here we review
the ways in which southern judges evaluated and dealt with picketing from the
point of view of the social interest in preserving the peace and in protecting
persons from intimidation.
Alabama. No purely common-law decision on the legal status of picket-
ing has been found in Alabama. In the earliest case found,12 the Alabama
Supreme Court ordered the courts below to enjoin all picketing, 13 but the deci-
sion rested upon the Alabama anti-picketing statute later held unconstitutional
in the Thornhill case. 14 After the Thornhill decision, the Alabama courts con-
sistently held peaceful picketing to be constitutionally privileged speech, t5
even if the pickets were strangers, that is, not employees of the picketed estab-
lishment.16 However, mass picketing by 300 persons, especially when obstruc-
tive, was held enjoinable, 17 and an injunction against all picketing was held
proper as late as 1964 when the picketing was in itself violent and enmeshed in
other violent conduct.' 8
10. For an extended analysis of picketing, see Part I of this Article, 59 N.C.L. REv. 99, 112-21
(1980).
11. Id.
12. That is, the earliest case assessing the legal status of picketing. Another fairly early case,
Welch v. State, 28 Ala. App. 273, 183 So. 879, cert. denied, 236 Ala. 577, 183 So. 886 (1938),
involved armed pickets but was a manslaughter indictment and did not pass upon the legality of
the picketing. See text accompanying note 76, infra.
13. Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruse, 189 Ala. 66, 66 So. 657 (1914).
14. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), rev~' 28 Ala. App. 527, 189 So. 913 (1939), a
decision that had upheld the Alabama statute on the authority of Hardie-Tynes.
15. E.g., Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Alliance v. Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265, 30 So. 2d
696, contemptproceedings dismissed sub non. Exparte Hacker, 250 Ala. 64, 33 So. 2d 324 (1947),
cer. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948). The Alabama court's intention to align itself with the northern
courts is evident in its citation of the Restatement of Torts and of the decisions of the "liberal"
New York Court of Appeals. Id. at 272-73, 30 So. 2d at 700.
16. Shiland v. Retail Clerks Local 1657, 259 Ala. 277, 66 So. 2d 146 (1953) (affirming an
order dissolving a temporary injunction largely on the authority of the United States Supreme
Court's picketing-free speech cases after Thornhill).
17. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Local 216 v. Brown & Root, Inc., 258 Ala. 430, 63 So. 2d
372 (1953) (Defendant demurred to a complaint alleging obstructive mass picketing by 300 per-
sons).
18. Local 612, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 276 Ala. 563, 165 So. 2d 113
(1964). This more than satisfied the requirements of Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941), in which the Supreme Court held that all picket-
[Vol. 59
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Arkansas. In the leading Arkansas case on picketing, decided in 1918, the
court observed that at first American judges had readily accepted picketing as
a privileged method of appealing for public support during strikes. 19 Later,
however,
it became more and more apparent that picketing was practiced and
resorted to, not alone for purposes of publicity and persuasion, but
for coercion and intimidation as well; so that, while the tendency of
the earlier cases was to uphold picketing as an exercise of the right of
free speech, the tendency of later cases is to restrict that right as an
act of coercion in its tendencies, and one which in its practical appli-
cation tends generally to breaches of the peace and other disorders. 20
The court affirmed an injunction against all picketing in front of the plaintiffs
restaurant where, despite the union's instructions against intimidatory con-
duct, the pickets had threatened and otherwise annoyed customers.2 ' The
public, said the court, is entitled to "bestow its favor and support upon one
side or the other free from any coercive molestation."22
Eight years later in 1926, in a case involving extreme violence, the injunc-
tion failed to mention picketing specifically, though it did prohibit interference
with the employer's operation. 23 Since then, the Arkansas Supreme Court has
approved injunctions against all picketing only when it was enmeshed in seri-
ous violence.
24
Florida. Prior to the Thornhill identification of picketing as a constitu-
tionally privileged form of speech,25 the Florida Supreme Court vacated an
injunction against all picketing when it found insufficient evidence of vio-
lence.2 6 After Thornhill, it affirmed injunctions against picketing in a pair of
cases in which it appeared that the picketing was enmeshed in serious vio-
lence. 27
ing might constitutionally be enjoined if enmeshed in extreme violence, even if the picketing itself
had been peaceable.
19. Local 313, Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Int'l Alliance v. Stathakis, 135 Ark. 86, 92,
205 S.W. 450, 452 (1918).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 91, 205 S.W. at 451.
22. Id. at 92, 205 S.W. at 452.
23. Jones v. State, 170 Ark. 863, 281 S.W. 663 (1926). In this contempt proceeding the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court interpreted the broad language of the decree as a prohibition of only
"menacing" or intimidatory conduct. Id. at 873, 281 S.W. at 666. The court dealt rather tenderly
with the contumacious union agent. Id. at 873, 281 S.W. at 667.
24. Smith v. F. & C. Eng'r Co., 225 Ark. 688, 285 S.W.2d 100 (1955); Local 858, Hotel &
Restaurant Employees Int'l Alliance v. Jiannas, 211 Ark. 352, 200 S.W.2d 763 (1947); Riggs v.
Tucker Duck & Rubber Co., 196 Ark. 571, 119 S.W.2d 507 (1938). In Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc.,
355 U.S. 131 (1957), the U.S. Supreme Court held that an Arkansas injunction against all picket-
ing had been issued improperly because it was not sufficiently enmeshed in violence to satisfy the
requirements of the Meadowmoor case, mentioned in note 18 supra.
25. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
26. Weissman v. Jureit, 132 Fla. 661, 181 So. 898 (1938). The court felt that picketing could
not be regarded as inherently coercive but that its coerciveness would vary with the places and
circumstances in which it occurred. Id. at 664-65, 181 So. at 899.
27. Miami Typographical Union No. 430 v. Ormerod, 61 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1952). For a fuller
account of the facts, see the lower court decision, Ormerod v. Typographical Union, I Fla. Supp.
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Georgia. In 1908, in its earliest picketing decision, the Georgia Supreme
Court held long before ThornhilI that picketing, as such, was a privileged form
of conduct, but that all picketing might be enjoined when the pickets were
guilty of coercive and intimidatory conduct. 28 Ten years later, however, the
court ruled that only intimidatory acts could be enjoined, not picketing as
such.29 This position was reaffirmed three years later.30 Since then injunc-
tions have been sustained in Georgia only against violent picketing or obstruc-
tive mass picketing.31
Lousiana. Picketing decisions were few in Louisiana, but they were ex-
traordinarily interesting. In Gily v. Hirsh32 rival jewelers were involved; there
was no labor dispute. The plaintiff, a jewelry auctioneer, sued a neighboring
retail jeweler for allegedly interfering with customers and for posting a sign
denigrating the plaintiff. The defendant counterclaimed, alleging that plaintiff
blocked his entrance and asking the court to enjoin the auction itself on the
ground that it was illegal. The court approved an injunction against blocking
defendant's entrance and interfering with his customers, but refused to enjoin
the auction.33
In another interesting Louisiana case, the New Orleans port commission-
ers refused to permit striking longshoremen to picket the area of the port
where loading operations were carried on. On suit by the union, the trial court
enjoined the commissioners, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that the commissioners had not abused their authority to maintain orderly
and peaceable conditions at the dock.34
These two decisions antedated federal labor legislation, but the Godchaux
Sugars case35 arose in 1955, while the United States Supreme Court was creat-
ing the preemption doctrine. There the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld an
injunction against picketing in an interunion dispute, saying that the picketing
was enjoinable, even if peaceable, because it was inducing a strike in violation
of a no-strike agreement at a crucial time, during the brief harvesting period of
the Louisiana sugar cane crop.36 The United States Supreme Court vacated
79 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1951). In Moore v. City Dry Cleaners & Laundry, Inc., 41 So. 2d 865 (1949), the
court cut back on an overbroad order but accepted an injunction against all picketing when it was
enmeshed in violence.
28. Jones v. Van Winkle Gin & Mach. Works, 131 Ga. 336, 340, 62 S.E. 236, 238 (1908).
29. Burgess v. Georgia, F. & A. Ry., 148 Ga. 417, 96 S.E. 865 (1918).
30. McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., 151 Ga. 776, 783, 108 S.E. 226, 230 (1921).
31. Fleming v. Terminal Transp. Co., 222 Ga. 583, 151 S.E.2d 137 (1966); NAACP v. Over,
street, 221 Ga. 16, 142 S.E.2d 816 (1965) (intimidatory mass picketing by NAACP to punish i
merchant for allegedly beating a 14-year-old for stealing), cert. dismissedas improidenlygranted,
384 U.S. 118 (1966); Pedigo v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 205 Ga. 392, 54 S.E.2d 252 (1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 937 (1950); Aired v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 205 Ga. 371, 54 S.E.2d 252 (1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 937 (1950); Robinson v. Bryant, 181 Ga. 722, 184 S.E. 298 (1936).
32. 122 La. 966, 48 So. 422 (1909).
33. Id. at 972, 48 So. at 424.
34. Keegan v. Board of Comm'rs, 154 La. 639, 98 So. 50 (1923).
35. Godchaux Sugars, Inc. v. Chaisson, 227 La. 146, 78 So. 2d 673, vacated as moot sub nom.
Chaisson v. Southcoast Corp., 350 U.S. 899 (1955).
36. Id. at 170-71, 78 So. 2d at 681.
[Vol. 59
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the injunction and remanded the case because it had become moot.37
Perhaps the most interesting of the Louisiana cases was one in which a
union sought and secured in the trial court an injunction against nonstrikers
who persisted in crossing its picket line. According to the union, the defend-
ants were guilty of provoking violence in crossing the picket line. A Louisiana
appellate court disagreed, considering it "novel" that "those likely to cause
violence in order to prevent the exercise of legal rights by others are protected
by an injunction which itself prevents the others from exercising those legal
rights in a proper manner."38
Mississiopi. In the only picketing case found in the state, the Mississippi
Supreme Court held that while violent mass picketing was wrongful and en-
joinable, the right of free speech as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court precluded an injunction against all picketing unless it was inextricably
enmeshed in extreme violence.39
North Carolina. While North Carolina has had its share of outrageously
violent strikes and picket lines,40 in no reported decision has there been an
injunction against all picketing; the North Carolina Supreme Court has never
permitted an injunction that has gone further than limiting the number of
pickets. In one case the injunction limited the picketing to "a reasonable
number" of persons at a time.41 In two cases the picketing was "limited" to
twenty-five persons,42 in another to ten,43 in still another, to four.44
Tennessee. Peaceable picketing, as such, seems always to have possessed
a privileged status in Tennessee, as it has in most of the other confederate
states. Indeed, even when enmeshed in serious violence, picketing as such has
not been enjoined in Tennessee. In the cases on picketing that have been
found, all decided after 1930, the farthest the Tennessee court has gone has
been to hold picketing properly limited in numbers when it has been en-
meshed in violence.45
37. Chaisson v. Southcoast Corp., 350 U.S. 899 (1955).
38. Independent Oil & Chem. Workers' Union v. Shell Oil Co., 150 So. 2d 102, 106 (La. App.
1963).
39. International Woodworkers v. Fair Lumber Co., 232 Miss. 401, 411, 99 So. 2d 452, 454
(1958) (citing and following Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957)). See Milk Wagon
Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
40. See notes 92-100 and accompanying text infra.
41. Citizens Co. v. Asheville Typographical Union, 187 N.C. 42, 121 S.E. 31 (1924). For a
detailed review of some early North Carolina equity decisions in labor disputes, see D. Mc-
CRACKEN, STRIKE INJUNCTIONS IN THE NEW SOUTH (1931). The title is, of course, misleading:
there were no injunctions against strikes in either the "new' or the "old" South.
42. Erwin Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union, 234 N.C. 321, 67 S.E.2d 372 (1951); Hart
Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Abrams, 231 N.C. 431, 57 S.E.2d 803 (1950).
43. Royal Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 234 N.C. 545, 67 S.E.2d 755 (1951).
44. Carolina Wood Turning Co. v. Wiggins, 247 N.C. 115, 100 S.E.2d 218 (1957) (but all
picketing was prohibited within 10 feet of entrance to the plant). Number and place limitations
were put on picketing also in Safie Mfg. Co. v. Arnold, 228 N.C. 375, 45 S.E.2d 577 (1947).
45. Gunn v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 201 Tenn. 38, 296 S.W.2d 843 (1956) (only mass
1981]
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Texas. A strict early attitude toward picketing has given way over the
years in Texas to an approach much the same as that prevailing in the other
states of the South and of the North. In the first picketing case46 to reach a
Texas appellate court, peaceful stranger picketing for recognition and the
closed shop was held unlawful and enjoinable as "provocative of violence and
bloodshed,"'47 as well as for inflicting unjustified harm. Three years later, in
1921, a Texas appellate court repeated its condemnation of all picketing, even
picketing accompanying a lawful economic strike; however, the court did not
enjoin picketing as such, but rather prohibited "going into and near [plain-
till's]. . . place of business for the purpose of interfering with the business and
intimidating its employds or assaulting or threatening them."48
Since these early cases, the normal practice has been to limit the number
of pickets, not to enjoin picketing entirely, even when there has been outra-
geous violence. 49 However, in one case the Texas Supreme Court held that an
intermediate appellate court erred in modifying a trial court's temporary in-
junction against all picketing when it had been enmeshed in violence.50 In
another appellate court decision, picketing with "unfair" signs was held en-
joinable when the signs were found libelous.5 1 More recently, the Texas
courts have been limiting picketing to two persons under a statute defining
"mass picketing" as picketing by more than two persons at a time.52
Conclusions. The foregoing review of the southern picketing cases pro-
duces the same conclusions as did our earlier review of the southern boycott
cases:53 there is no ground for the belief that the southern courts were harder
picketing enjoined); Nashville Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 187 Tenn. 444, 215 S.W.2d 818
(1948) (number and place limitations only, despite incidents of violence); Rowe Transfer & Stor-
age Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 186 Tenn. 265, 209 S.W.2d 35 (1948) (injunction
against all picketing held improper).
46. Webb v. Cooks Local 748, 205 S.W. 465, 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) (noting that this was
the first picketing case to reach an appellate court in Texas, id. at 466).
47. Id. at 467.
48. Cooks' Local Union v. Papageorge, 230 S.W. 1086, 1087 (rex. Civ. App. 1921).
49. Farah Mfg. Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 483 S.W.2d 271 (rex. Civ. App.
1972) (denial of a temporary injunction against violence, on preemption grounds, reversed); The
Fair, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 131, 157 S.W.2d 716 (rex. Civ. App. 1941) (denial of temporary
injunction against picketing affirmed when proof of violent conduct was inadequate); Thomas v.
International Seamen's Union, 101 S.W.2d 328 (rex. Civ. App. 1937) (picketing allowed on ap-
peal despite considerable violence found by trial court, id. at 331); ILGWU Local 123 v. Dorothy
Frocks Co., 95 S.W.2d 1346 (rex. Civ. App. 1936) (trial court allowance of picketing by three
persons affirmed despite considerable evidence of violence by pickets, including assaults upon
police).
50. Texas Foundaries, [sic] Inc. v. International Molders Union, 151 Tex. 239, 248 S.W. 2d
460 (1952), revkg241 S.W.2d 213 (rex. Civ. App. 1951); accord, United Farm Workers Organizing
Comm. v. La Casita Farms, Inc., 439 S.W.2d 398 (rex. Civ. App. 1968).
51. Carter v. Bradshaw, 138 S.W.2d 187 (rex. Civ. App. 1940). Compare ILGWU Local 123
v. Dorothy Frocks Co., 95 S.W.2d 1346 (rex. Civ. App. 1936), in which the court affirmed a denial
of an injunction against all picketing while also affirming an injunction against the placards and
banners being carried by the pickets. See clause (b) of the order, 95 S.W.2d at 1347.
52. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154d § 1 (Vernon 1970). See Sabine Area Bldg. Trades
Council v. Temple Assoc., Inc., 468 S.W.2d 501 (rex. Civ. App. 1971); Geissler v. Coussoulls, 424
S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
53. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
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on unions and picketing than were the northern courts. Indeed, the southern
courts on the whole were more permissive with picketing than were the con-
servative northern courts typified by Massachusetts. 54 Although Alabama had
a statute outlawing all picketing, once the United States Supreme Court held
that statute unconstitutional,55 the Alabama courts went along with the other
southern courts to hold that picketing was enjoinable only when enmeshed in
extreme violence.56 This position was precisely the same as that taken by the
Illinois Supreme Court and affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in
the Meadowmoor case.57 Moreover, it was the same as the position articulated
by the New York Court of Appeals during its "liberal" heyday in Nann v.
Raimit.58 Southern judges in the picketing cases seemed aligned with or in-
fluenced more by the "liberal" rather than the "conservative" northern courts.
B "Unfair" Signs and Name-Calling in the Southern Courts
Except in Texas, there were few southern cases involving the legality of
"unfair" signs and name-calling in labor disputes. What cases do exist are as
follows:
Alabama. In a decision in 1904, the Alabama Supreme Court made it
clear that "unfair" listings by unions would rarely be found actionable. A
building contractor sued for libel when a union publication put him on its
"unfair" list and said he would remain there until he "set himself square" with
organized labor. According to plaintiff, the "unfair" listing implied that he
was dishonest, faithless, and unreliable. The Alabama Supreme Court re-
versed a judgment in plaintiff's favor, holding that "unfair" listings did not
ordinarily carry with them the imputations alleged by plaintiff.59
Georgia. The Georgia Supreme Court held contemporaneously with the
neighboring Alabama Supreme Court that "unfair" listings were not libelous.
The defendant union had published in a local newspaper a statement that the
plaintiff, a partnership, was "unfair" in being the only merchant not closing its
doors by six p.m. in the hot summer months. According to the Georgia court,
the use of the word "unfair," when read in the context of the whole article,
imputed no moral turpitude to plaintiff and in no sense challenged its credit,
54. Eg., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896). For a review of the Mas-
sachusetts picketing cases to 1951, see Petro, Picketing as Persuasion in Massachusetts, 2 LAB. L.J.
643 (1951). Apparently the Massachusetts Supreme Judical Court had never to that date found
picketing peaceable enough to be allowable.
55. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
56. See notes 12-18 and accompanying text supra.
57. Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
58. 255 N.Y. 307, 174 N.E. 690 (1931) (injunction against all picketing reluctantly affirmed,
per Judge Cardozo, when trial court thought the violence so extensive that no picketing should be
allowed).
59. Labor Review Publishing Co. v. Galliher, 153 Ala. 364, 45 So. 188 (1907).
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solvency, or business reliability.60
North Carolina. There was no relevant case in North Carolina until 1967,
when _H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers was decided.6 1 During an
organizing drive, a union published material stating that the plaintiff employer
was so evil that there was no level to which it would not sink to keep its em-
ployees from other employment. After the union was unsuccessful in having
the case removed to the federal courts, 62 the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that the complaint stated a good cause of action in alleging that the union
spoke with knowledge of the falsity of its statements or reckless disregard of
whether those statements were true or false. 63
Texas. In the first case in which it ruled upon the legality of the use of
"opprobrious epithets" in the course of a labor dispute, the Texas Supreme
Court took a strong stand in favor of what it considered freedom of speech. In
a habeas corpus proceeding it held that an injunction against such epithets was
unconstitutional and void:
Let it once be admitted that courts may arrogate the authority of
deciding what the individual may say and may not say, what he may
write and may not write, and by an injunction writ require him to
adapt the expression of his sentiments to only what some judge may
deem fitting and proper, and there may be readily brought about the
very condition against which the constitutional guaranty was in-
tended as a permanent protection. Liberty of speech will end where
such control of it begins.
• . . There is no power in courts to make one person speak only well
of another.64
The court's rhetoric should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the
injunction made no attempt to tell the defendant what to say. It merely pro-
hibited unionists from calling female telephone operators dirty names. In con-
trast, fifty-two years later, a Texas appellate court held that it had
constitutional power to restrain unionists from parading with maliciously false
signs and from the use of insulting and obscene language. 65 And six years
after that, another Texas appellate court held in a case involving rival unions
that it had the authority to determine the legality of the allegedly libelous
60. J.B. Watters & Son v. Retail Clerks Local 479, 120 Ga. 424,47 S.E. 911 (1904). The court
cited mainly northern authorities for its decision.
61. 270 N.C. 160, 154 S.E.2d 344 (1967).
62. Judge Craven, then a trial court judge, accepted the removal, but the Fourth Circuit
reversed, 336 F.2d 160 (1964), and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's remand
to the state courts, 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
63. 270 N.C. at 177, 154 S.E.2d at 358.
64. Exparte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335, 220 S.W. 75, 76 (1920).
65. Farah Mfg. Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 483 S.W.2d 271 (rex. Civ. App.
1972).
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name-calling of one of the unions involved.66
In Cafeteria Employees Local 302 v. Angelos,67 a 1943 decision, the
United States Supreme Court held that "unfair" signs are not to be construed
as falsifying facts and that they are constitutionally protected speech.68 Three
years earlier, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals had held in Carter v. Brad-
shaw69 that "unfair" signs could constitutionally be enjoined when addressed
to an automobile dealer only because he had had some building done by a
contractor who employed nonunion labor against the desires of the picketing
union.70 It is fairly clear that the preemption doctrine of the United States
Supreme Court does not oust state-court jurisdiction in such cases.71 How-
ever, it is not quite so clear that the point of view expressed in the Cafeteria
Employees case has been abandoned,72 so that the earlier Texas case may no
longer be law.
Virginia. No relevant decision has been found in Virginia prior to 1951,
when McWhorter v. Commonwealth was decided.73 There, during a minority
strike by six women members of the International Ladies' Garment Workers
Union in a plant employing a hundred persons, the six sang such verses as
"when the roll is called up yonder will you whores be there?" One of the
female nonstrikers was so shocked by the pickets that she fainted. Applying a
statute prohibiting interference with the right to work by the use of insulting
language, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the pickets.
The court considered Cafeteria Employees but concluded that it was distin-
guishable.74
Conclusion. We have now reviewed all the decisions of the courts in the
states of the old confederacy on the legality of "unfair" listings, "opprobrious
epithets," and other allegedly libelous and slanderous materials. It would be
difficult for anyone to conclude, on the basis of the actual cases, that the south-
ern courts were especially hard on the use or misuse of language by trade
unions. In a rational and decent civil order, there would be no special privi-
lege for language that caused pain or economic harm. It would be as actiona-
ble as other conduct. On the whole, the southern courts, like the courts in
66. Manchester v. IAM, 567 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960
(1979).
67. 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
68. Id. at 295.
69. 138 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
70. Id. at 190.
71. Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 55 (1966).
72. In Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 139 (1957), the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the states retained jurisdiction over violence in labor disputes but that a state-court injunction
against all picketing would not be permitted under the picketing-free speech doctrine unless it met
the Meadowmoor test ofenmeshment in outrageous violence. See Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753
v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941). On the same reasoning it might be thought
that while the states retain jurisdiction over common-law libel complaints, they must meet the free
speech standards set in Angelos.
73. 191 Va. 857, 63 S.E.2d 20 (1951).
74. Id. at 861-66, 63 S.E.2d at 22-24.
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most of the rest of the country, rejected this value judgment, holding that
words are somehow entitled to a greater area of privilege than other acts. The
Virginia court in Mc 9horter drew the line at calling women "whores" merely
because they refused to join in a strike called by a small minority of union
activists. But this seems to have been more a decision in favor of a minimum
of civility than one against unions. It scarcely supports the contention that the
courts of the old South were unusually hard on unions.
C Outright Violence in the Southern Courts
We review here all the southern cases involving outright violence in labor
disputes-arson, assault, bombing, physical obstruction, vandalism, and so on.
Despite the frequent references one sees in the literature to employer violence
or provocation, both are largely absent from the cases. The aggressors in most
of the cases are unionists, and the victims are nonunion workers or unionists
who prefer to work when their leaders tell them to strike.
There are few southern cases of labor violence before 1930. I believe this
is because there was little large-scale business in the South before 1930,75 not
because unions in the South, or southerners, were less violent than their north-
ern counterparts. In any event, a significant proportion of the cases covered
here are post-1930. Even with these, there still was not a great number of
cases, although these few were violent enough, especially in North Carolina
and Texas. On whether or not the southern courts dealt more harshly with
unions in violence cases than did the northern courts, we shall have something
to say after reviewing the cases state by state.
Alabama. The defendant in Welch v. State76 was a textile union orga-
nizer who set up an armed picket line in an effort to keep employees from
entering a mill he sought to "organize." When the chief deputy sheriff and
other deputies tried to arrest defendant, gun shots were exchanged, and the
chief deputy was killed. Convicted of manslaughter, defendant appealed. The
conviction was affirmed, however, on the ground that although the deputies
were without warrants, the arrest attempt was lawful. Even had the arrest not
been lawful, said the court, the killing of the deputy would still not have been
justified. The use of deadly force was not appropriate when defendant was
threatened only with arrest.7 7
Cases such as Welch illustrate the virtues of the labor injunction and one
of the main reasons for its wide use in the period before the anti-injunction
acts were passed. Had there been no picketing at all, or had the picketing been
limited to one or two persons by a well-policed decree, the killing probably
would not have occurred, and the union organizer would not have had to be
incarcerated.
75. See the conclusion to Part I of this Article, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 99, 142-46 (1980).
76. 28 Ala. App. 273, 183 So. 879, cert. denied, 236 Ala. 577, 183 So. 886 (1938).
77. Id. at -, 183 So. 2d at 885.
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The other Alabama cases of outright union violence contain no unusual
facts. One involved violent and obstructive mass picketing by 300 persons and
the affirmance of a temporary injunction against it.7 8 Another involved the all
too common contumaciousness of the Teamsters Union in the face of an in-
junction against outrageously violent picketing.79 The last Alabama case
worth noting achieved a certain degree of fame. U4W v. Russell80 was one of
the cases in which the United States Supreme Court agreed to permit the state
courts to continue to exercise jurisdiction over union violence, notwithstand-
ing that such violence also violates the National Labor Relations Act.
Arkansas. Besides the five cases of picketing violence cited previously,8 1
there were two other Arkansas cases worth noting. In one, a federal district
court enjoined Arkansas authorities from seeking orders in the Arkansas
courts prohibiting the employer in a labor dispute from transporting striker
replacements into Arkansas.8 2 Apparently, instead of attempting to prevent or
punish strike violence, the Arkansas authorities thought it better to deny the
strike-bound firm the right to try to keep its business operating.
In the other Arkansas case,8 3 two members of a painters' union were con-
victed under a statute making it a crime "by the use of force or violence, or
threat [thereof] to prevent or attempt to prevent any person from engaging in a
lawful vocation."8 4 The two were sentenced to one year in prison for brutally
beating a painting contractor who operated nonunion with four negro painters
and used a spray gun contrary to union rules.
Florida. Union violence figured directly in three Florida decisions. Two
we have already cited in the section on picketing,8 5 the third was Florida's first
labor case.8 6 There, while holding that a union was privileged to strike against
the employment of nonunion labor, the court affirmed an injunction against
threats and assaults.
A fourth Florida decision indicates how inadequate appellate court re-
ports may be as a basis for judging the extent to which violence prevails in
labor disputes. The issue in this case was whether or not a work stoppage by
bus drivers amounted to a strike within the meaning of a Florida statue, but
the report indicates that the stoppage traced to the imprisoning of a bus driver
for assault and battery and that in the course of their refusal to work the bus
78. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Local 216 v. Brown & Root, Inc., 258 Ala. 430, 63 So. 2d
372 (1953).
79. Local 612, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 276 Ala. 563, 165 So. 2d 113
(1964).
80. 356 U.S. 634 (1958), afl'g 264 Ala. 456, 88 So. 2d 175 (1956).
81. See notes 19-24 and accompanying text, supra.
82. Arkansas v. Kansas & Tex. Coal Co., 96 F. 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1899), rev'd on other
grounds, 183 U.S. 185 (1901).
83. Smith v. State, 207 Ark. 104, 179 S.W.2d 185 (1944).
84. Id. at 106, 179 S.W.2d at 186.
85. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
86. Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907).
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drivers blockaded a Miami street.8 7
Georgia. Seven Georgia cases involving union violence and obstruction
are cited in the section on picketing.88 The only additional case worth noting
did not involve a union or a normal labor dispute, but it is extremely interest-
ing and attests the bona fides of the Georgia courts in their attempts to control
violence. An 1887 decision, Spencer v. State,8 9 was a criminal prosecution
against former slaves for shooting an overseer. It appears that the overseer
had threatened the defendants, shot at them, and frightened their families.
One of the defendants shot back and urged the other to do the same, but he
refused. On appeal from a conspiracy conviction, the Georgia Supreme Court
held that there was no unlawful conspiracy. The only combined action was
the urging to shoot, and that was privileged self defense. The court said:
The superintendent of a plantation has no more right to terrify the
laborers under him, and their families, than they have to terrify him
and his family. And this is so, regardless of the color of the respec-
tive parties. All races, and all classes, are alike bound to keep the
peace, and observe the laws.90
Louisiana. No cases were found other than those cited in the picketing
section.9 1
North Carolina. Only a small proportion of the North Carolina labor
force belongs to unions, but there has been a relatively large number of re-
ported cases on union violence in the state. In the section on picketing, six
North Carolina cases of picketing enmeshed in serious violence are cited.92
Twelve others are significant enough for citation. 93 Of these, some were outra-
geous indeed, involving union confrontations with police and troops,94 bomb-
ings, 95 arson,96 and mass assaults.97 One of the most interesting and
87. State ex rel. Frazier v. Coleman, 156 Fla. 413, 23 So. 2d 477 (1945).
88. See notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra.
89. 77 Ga. 155, 3 S.E. 661 (1887).
90. Id. at 156, 3 S.E. at 661-62.
91. See notes 32-38 and accompanying text supra.
92. See notes 41-44 and accompanying text supra.
93. In re Clayton, 181 F. Supp. 834 (M.D.N.C. 1960); Abrams v. Hart Cotton Mills, Inc., 85
F. Supp. 664 (E.D.N.C. 1949); Blue Jeans Corp. v. Clothing Workers, 275 N.C. 503, 169 S.E.2d
867 (1969); Reverie Lingerie, Inc. v. McCain, 258 N.C. 353, 128 S.E.2d 835 (1963) (for the facts of
this case, see State v. Williams, 255 N.C. 82, 120 S.E.2d 442 (1961)); State v. Walker, 251 N.C. 465,
112 S.E.2d 61, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 832 (1960); State v. Moseley, 251 N.C. 285, 111 S.E.2d 308(1959); Henderson Cotton Mills v. Local 584, Textile Workers, 251 N.C. 234, 111 S.E.2d 476(1959); Harriet Cotton Mills v. Local 578, Textile Workers Union, 251 N.C. 218, 111 S.E.2d 457(1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 941 (1960); Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Bonano, 242 N.C. 587, 89 S.E.2d
115 (1955); State v. Hoffman, 199 N.C. 328, 154 S.E. 314 (1930); Uptegraff Mfg. Co. v. Electrical
Workers, Local 189, 20 N.C. App. 504, 202 S.E.2d 309, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 234, 204 S.E.2d 24(1974); Marion Mfg. Co. v. United Textile Workers (N.C. Super. Ct. 1929) (unreported but the
texts of the complaint and the temporary restraining order are reproduced in D. MCCRACKEN,
supra note 41, at 215-27).
94. Harriet Cotton Mills v. Local 578, Textile Workers Union, 251 N.C. 218, 111 S.E.2d 457(1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 941 (1960); State v. Hoffman, 199 N.C. 328, 154 S.E. 314 (1930).
95. State v. Williams, 255 N.C. 82, 120 S.E.2d 442 (1961).
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instructive of the North Carolina cases is State v. Hoffman,98 which features a
confrontation between a state-trooper captain and a union bully.99 Perhaps
the most noxious incident is found in an unreported case in which violent
unionists were alleged to have organized small boys into slingshot gangs and
encouraged them to attack nonstriking employees in a strike-torn village.100
South Carolina. No South Carolina case directly involving union vio-
lence has been found. However, in a 1922 case a lawyer unsuccessfully sued a
union for a fee under an alleged contract to assist the union in prosecuting the
alleged murderer of a union member. 10' And in 1957, a union unsuccessfully
sought an exparte restraining order in federal court against an employer for
allegedly interfering with the union's organizers by intimidation, violence,
threats, and the use of insulting language. The restraining order was denied
for failure of diversity of citizenship.' 0 2
Tennessee. Extreme violence appeared in five Tennessee cases, some of
them relatively recent, 103 but the Tennessee courts seem to have been gener-
ally tolerant of union defendants. For example, in a 1930 decision a Tennes-
see appellate court reversed a contempt conviction on the dubious ground that
a settlement agreement between the employer and the union had discharged
the injunction and made it inoperative as of the time the unionists persisted in
the wholesale violence that had been enjoined. 1' 4 In a later case, 10 5 seventy-
five to one hundred unionists defied an injunction against mass picketing by
marching on a struck telephone building and shooting off firecrackers. A dy-
namite explosion occurred on the roof of the telephone company's power plant
during these activities, but the Tennessee court limited its contempt holding to
the violation of the order against mass picketing.
In Strunk v. Lewis Coal Co. 106 a Tennessee appeals court again vacated a
criminal contempt conviction, despite admittedly overwhelming evidence of
contumacious violence, because the trial court had failed to make clear that
the jury should apply the "reasonable doubt" standard to the unionists. Fi-
96. Reverie Lingerie, Inc. v. McCain, 258 N.C. 353, 128 S.E.2d 835 (1963).
97. State v. Mosely, 251 N.C. 285, 111 S.E.2d 308 (1959).
98. 199 N.C. 328, 154 S.E. 314 (1930).
99. See id. at 332, 154 S.E. at 316.
100. See D. McCRAcaN , supra note 41, at 84.
101. Foster v. Local 1,233, UTW, 120 S.C. 225, 112 S.E. 917 (1922).
102. Robertson v. Limestone Mfg. Co., 20 F.R.D. 365 (W.D.S.C. 1957).
103. Gunn v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 201 Tenn. 38, 296 S.W.2d 843 (1956); Nashville Corp. v.
United Steelworkers of America, 187 Tenn. 444, 215 S.W.2d 818 (1948); Rowe Transfer & Storage
Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 186 Tenn. 265, 209 S.W.2d 35 (1948); Strunk v. Lewis
Coal Co., 547 S.W.2d 252 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976); American Glanzstoff Corp. v. Miller (Tenn.
Ch. 1929) (reviewed in D. McCRAcKcN, supra note 41, at 94-113) (no further citation available).
A damages judgment of $116,500 was issued against the United Steelworkers Union for assaulting
nonstrikers in Rogers v. Steelworkers, No. 6093 (Law Court, Johnson City, Tenn., filed Nov. 24,
1980).
104. American Glanzstoff Corp. v. Miller (Tenn. Ch. 1929) (reviewed in D. McCRAcKEN,
supra note 41, at 94-113) (no further citation available).
105. Gunn v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 201 Tenn. 38, 296 S.W.2d 843 (1956).
106. 547 S.W.2d 252 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
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nally, as noted in the section above on picketing, 107 the Tennessee courts con-
sistently refused to enjoin all picketing, even when enmeshed in extreme
violence, despite the United States Supreme Court's position that an injunc-
tion against all picketing is proper in such cases.108
Texas. Charges of employer violence are fairly common in the literature
of labor relations, but documentation is sparse and union prosecutions against
employers have been even rarer-except in Texas. Two Texas cases contain
charges of employer violence. One charged an employer with responsibility
for the murder of a unionist by a Texas ranger paid by the employer to guard
its property. The Texas Supreme Court reversed a judgment against the em-
ployer on the ground, among others, that while the employer was paying for
the ranger's services (besides paying regular taxes), officials of the Texas rang-
ers retained complete control over his conduct. 109
In the second case charging employer violence, a unionist sued the man-
ager of a theatre who threw eggs at pickets and struck one of them. Judgment
against the employer was reversed on the grounds that the trial court had erro-
neously excluded evidence of provocation and that plaintiffs had not estab-
lished that the theatre manager was acting within the scope of his authority. 10
The numerous Texas cases involving union violence,"' sometimes of a
particularly outrageous character,' 2 occasionally produced some instructive
judicial comments. For example, in a case in which Judge Bobbit dissented
from an affirmance of contempt convictions on the ground, among others, that
there are always two sides to what he called "labor-management" disputes,
Judge Smith, concurring, took pains to point out that the case really involved
the rights of nonstrikers "to continue at work. . . without being stalked, way-
laid, beaten, their faces and bodies slashed with broken glass, their clothes
publicly stripped from their bodies."' " 3
The unique significance of violence in labor disputes was brought out by
107. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
108. Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
109. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Hudson, 17 S.W.2d 793 (rex. 1929).
110. Horwitz v. Dickerson, 25 S.W.2d 966 (rex. Civ. App. 1930).
111. Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Tex. 1978) (damages awarded to nonunion vic-
tims of union violence under Civil Rights Act of 1871); Farah Mfg. Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers, 483 S.W.2d 271 (rex. Civ. App. 1972); United Farm Workers Organizing Comm. v. La
Casita Farms, Inc., 439 S.W.2d 398 (rex, Civ. App. 1968); Ivey v. Texas, 247 S.W.2d 105 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1951); The Fair, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 131, 157 S.W.2d 716 (rex. Civ. App. 1941)(denial of temporary injunction affirmed on ground that allegations of violence were not ade-
quately proved); Cooks Local Union v. Papageorge, 230 S.W. 1086 (rex. Civ. App. 1921); Ex
parle Tucker, 110 Tex. 335, 220 S.W. 75 (1920) (contempt conviction vacated on ground that
injunction against opprobrious epithets was unconstitutional); see notes 64-66 and accompanying
text supra.
112. Texas Foundaries [sic], Inc. v. International Moulders Union, 151 Tex. 239, 248 S.W.2d
460 (1952); Texas State Fed'n of Labor v. Brown & Root, Inc., 246 S.W.2d 938 (rex. Civ. App.
1952); Exparte Frye, 143 Tex. Crim. 9, 156 S.W.2d 531 (1941); Thomas v. International Seamen's
Union, 101 S.W.2d 328 (rex. Civ. App. 1937); ILGWU Local 123 v. Dorothy Frocks Co., 97
S.W.2d 379 (rex. Civ. App. 1936).
113. ILGWU Local 123 v. Dorothy Frocks Co., 97 S.W.2d 379, 382 (rex. Civ. App. 1936).
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Judge Krueger in another Texas decision. 1 4 This case involved a challenge to
the constitutionality of a Texas statute making it a felony to prevent or to
attempt to prevent, by "force or violence," any person from engaging in any
lawful employment. Among other arguments, the defendant unionist con-
tended that the statute denied equal protection of the laws because ordinary
assaults, not involving employment, are misdemeanors, not felonies. Judge
Krueger rejected the contention on the ground that the type of assault prohib-
ited by the statute is "not only directed against the person but against his voca-
tion . . . [and] in a measure affects the entire economic fabric of the
country."' 15 Rarely has a court so succinctly defined the particular gravity of
labor violence, and the deficiencies of the commonly held position that courts
need to be especially indulgent toward violence in labor disputes. 116
Virginia. No union violence case was found in Virginia prior to United
Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp.,17 a 1954 case notable
because it produced one of the most significant exceptions to the preemption
doctrine, which excludes state court jurisdiction over most types of conduct
subject to federal labor relations legislation.' 18 In Laburnum the plaintiff em-
ployer was awarded damages against the United Mine Workers for the harm
done by U.M.W. violence. Justice Douglas dissented from the United States
Supreme Court's decision to allow the Virginia courts to retain jurisdiction
over such conduct, saying that the union's "conduct is the stuff out of which
labor-management strife has been made, ever since trade unionism began its
growth."119 Apparently Justice Douglas believed that for unions prescriptive
rights accrue to the use of violence.
In another still more recent case, the United Mine Workers again at-
tempted to secure a special privilege to engage in outrageous violence by seek-
ing removal to a federal court. Citing the Laburnum case among others, the
federal district court remanded the case to the state court in which the suit had
been brought. 120
114. Exparte Frye, 143 Tex. Crim. 9, 156 S.W.2d 531 (1941).
115. Id. at 15, 156 S.W.2d at 534.
116. Justice Frankfurter typified this supercilious but obtuse judicial attitude when he cau-
tioned state judges against enjoining all picketing merely because unionists had grown tempora-
rily violent in "a moment of animal exuberance." Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941). Like Justice Douglas in the Laburnum case
see notes 117-19 and accompanying text infra, Justice Frankfurter had an inadequate grasp of the
extent to which violence in labor disputes was damaging society, morally and economically.
These justices may have had a great deal more to learn from jurists such as Judge Krueger than
they apparently knew.
117. United Constr. Workers, U.M.W. Dist. 50 v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656
(1954).
118. Under this exception state courts retain jurisdiction over common-law tort actions for
damages where the genesis of the tort action is conduct that also constitutes an unfair labor prac-
tice under the Labor Management Relations Act. Id. at 657.
119. Id. at 670 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See the comment on Justice Douglas' attitude in note
116 supra.
120. Norton Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 387 F. Supp. 50 (W.D. Va. 1974).
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Conclusions. It is hard to see how any person disinterestedly examining
all the cases gathered here could justly conclude that the southern courts were
biased against unions. Perhaps the most revealing judicial comments were
those of Judges Smith and Bobbit in the Garment Workers case,'21 of Judge
Krueger in Frye,122 of Justice Douglas in Laburnum,123 and of Justice Frank-
furter in Meadowmoor.l2 4 Bobbit, Douglas, and Frankfurter apparently be-
lieved that violence in labor disputes should be dealt with tolerantly because
in the class struggle between "management" and "labor," "labor" is so disad-
vantaged that it needs leeway. Judge Smith would have none of this because
he saw violence in labor disputes as normally involving one set of workers.
abusing another, 25 and he did not believe that a decent legal system could
tolerate such aggression. Indeed, Judge Krueger added, society had more than
a common interest in maintaining the peace in labor disputes. Ordinary, "cas-
ual," violence is bad enough and must be prevented or punished if civil order
is to prevail. But systematic, continual violence of the kind that occurs in la-
bor disputes is much worse, he thought, because of its profound effect on the
entire social and economic fabric. 126
Judge Krueger might have gone on to say that mankind's sustained effort
to replace violent aggression and theft with peaceful and efficient production
as a means of improving the human condition is one of the more significant
aspects of human history. Wars among nations and crimes within nations rep-
resent-the unfinished business of mankind in this respect, but so too does vio-
lence in labor disputes. Labor violence is no more socially acceptable than the
wasteful violence of war or the nonproductive and violent wealth transfers of
thugs and muggers. Violence in labor disputes is fundamentally a monopolis-
tic device. It is designed deliberately to eliminate competition, usually the
competition of unorganized workers or of members of rival unions, and, by
eliminating this competition, to cause employers (and ultimately consumers)
to pay more than they need to pay for labor services.
As a means of eliminating competition, union violence is thus no different
in physical or social terms from the kind of violence that has occurred occa-
sionally between rival businesses, the prototype of anti-social, predatory, un-
fair competition-"competition" that raises costs and prices rather than
reducing them. The courts have always ruled sternly against violent forms of
business competition.' 27 Perhaps this is why rival businesses almost never re-
121. See note 113 and accompanying text supra.
122. See notes 114-15 and accompanying text supra.
123. See note 119 and accompanying text supra.
124. See note 116 supra.
125. See text accompanying note 113 supra. In the usual labor dispute that reached the courts
prior to the new deal legislation, the disputants were rival workers, usually organized workers
against unorganized workers. For extensive documentation, see Petro, supra note 7, at 411-28.
126. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
127. The third installment of this series, to be published in volume 60 of this Review, exam-
ines at length the growth of the tort category now known as "unfair competition," going back as
far as Garret v. Taylor, Cro. Jac. 567, 79 Eng. Rep. 485 (1621) and the Schoolmasters' Case, Y.B.
11 H. 4, fol. 45, pl. 21 (1410). For a more recent example of business tactics analogous to the
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sort to violence anymore. It is recognized in business as the archetypal form of
unfair competition.
Expanded, Judge Krueger's point is that when a unionist assaults a per-
son who prefers to work during a strike and is willing to accept a lower wage
rate than the unionist insists upon,'28 the moral and economic effects of such
an assault are even graver than those resulting from the violence that occurs
occasionally among rival businesses. Labor costs are far and away the princi-
pal costs of production. Direct and indirect labor costs together amount in the
average firm to more than seventy percent of all costs.129 If this vastly prepon-
derant element in costs is taken out of competition, the value of competition to
society is drastically reduced, while the most precious of all spiritual values,
personal freedom, is brutally diminished.
The union slogan that wages must be taken out of competition is a pre-
scription for moral, economic, and social ruin. It is absurd for a society to
expend large resources in an effort to promote business competition, as we do,
while encouraging the removal of competition among workers, as our current
statutory labor policies do.
Neither now nor earlier, however, have our courts--either in the North or
in the South-formally regarded violence among workers as a legitimate form
of competition. However tolerant the most liberal of the northern courts
might have been of the economically coercive boycotts that unions perfected,
they drew the line against violence. The decisions of the New York Court of
Appeals were not different in this respect from the decisions of other northern
courts.' 30 And there is no perceptible difference between the way in which the
southern courts and the New York courts handled labor violence cases. 131
This fact should put to rest forever the accusation that the southern courts
were more unfriendly to unions that the northern courts were, and that unions
have done relatively badly in the south because of institutional mistreatment.
II. THE LABOR INJUNCTION IN THE SOUTHERN COURTS
Equity is not a purely discretionary system of legal administration; in the
best courts and among the best judges, as we shall see, there is as rigid a
framework of principle underlying the discretionary features of equitable rem-
edies as there is anywhere else in the law. However, in the nature of the mis-
coercive practices of organized labor, see Gilly v. Hirsh, 122 La. 966, 48 So. 422 (1909). See text
accompanying note 32 supra.
128. A lower wage rate does not necessarily mean lower earnings. In fact pushing wage rates
up too high is often an extremely effective way of reducing earnings to the vanishing point, as
stonemasons and bricklayers on Manhattan Island have learned, as they watch steel and glass
buildings take the place of stone and brick.
129. The implications of this are dealt with brilliantly in Professor William H. Hutt's forth-
coming book, LABOR's DISADVANTAGE.
130. Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307, 174 N.E. 690 (1931).
131. For New York cases, see, e.g., Steinkritz Amusement Corp. v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 294, 178
N.E. 11 (1931); Sun Printing & Publishing Co. v. Delaney, 48 A.D. 623,62 N.Y.S. 750 (1900); New
York Cent. Iron Works v. Brennan, 105 N.Y.S. 865, 868, 871 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1907), permanent
injunction granted, 116 N.Y.S. 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1909).
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sion of equity to prevent irreparable injury, a considerable amount of
discretion must be vested in the trial judge (the chancellor, properly speaking)
to decide whether or not immediate relief should be granted before any real
proof of illegality can be made. With discretion, unfortunately, comes the po-
tential for bias in favor of or against one party or the other. Therefore, if there
is any truth in the contention that unions have done badly in the South and
that institutional anti-unionism is to blame, evidence of it should appear in the
southern labor-injunction cases.
In an effort to uncover such evidence of bias among trial judges as may
exist, we begin with a general survey of the results of applications for injunc-
tive relief in labor disputes in the South both at the trial-court and at the ap-
pellate-court levels. We proceed then to examine the cases in more detail,
comparing the doctrines and principles applied in the southern cases with
those of the contemporaneous northern cases, seeking in this way to establish
the basis for a comparative judgment, since no other seems feasible. We end
Part II with a brief review of southern contempt proceedings.
Definitive demonstrations of the presence or absence of undue bias
among judges are very hard tasks even in individual cases. When it comes to
dealing with all southern judges over a hundred year period, the thought of a
definitive demonstration would be absurd. However, there is no way to evalu-
ate the charge that southern judges were biased other than to examine what
they did. In any event, a documented examination such as this is bound to be
better than the mere assertion of southern bias that has thus far dominated
discussion of the issue.
A4. General Summary of the Southern Labor Injunction Cases
We have collected 186 southern labor-injunction cases, 72 decided before
1942 and 114 after 1941.132 The pre-1942 cases are all we found and include
some that were not officially reported. However, we have not attempted to
exhaust the post-1941 cases in all the states, since the state courts have been so
heavily influenced in this period by national labor legislation and by the fed-
eral preemption doctrine. Instead we have tried to exhaust the cases only in
North Carolina, one of the least organized, and in Texas, one of the more
heavily organized of the southern states, 133 while taking fairly large samples of
the post-1941 cases in the other states of the old confederacy. This procedure
establishes a fair basis for evaluating the southern labor decisions both when
132. We have used the period 1940-1942 as the dividing point for fairly obvious reasons:
before then the southern courts were relatively unfettered by national labor legislation or by the
constitutional doctrines of the United States Supreme Court. If there was anything like a particu-
larly "southern" view, comparing the pre-1942 cases with the post-1941 cases should help to ex-
pose it.
133. The most recent data show North Carolina with 242,000 union and employee-association
members, or 10.7% of its labor force; and Texas with 698,000 for 13.3% of its labor force. U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DE'T OF LABOR, BULL No. 2079 DIRECrORY OF NATIONAL
UNIONS AND EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS, 1979, at 72, Table 19 (1980).
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the courts were independent and when they were virtually incorporated into
the federal judicial system.
A general summary of all 186 southern labor-injunction cases is found in
Table I. As the table shows, trial courts granted injunctive relief in forty-eight
and denied it in twenty-four of the seventy-two pre-1942 cases. In the 114
post-1941 cases, the trial courts granted injunctive relief in ninety-four and
denied it in twenty. The proportion of grants to applications was thus sixty-
seven percent in the pre-1942 cases and eighty-two percent in the post-1941
cases. Since no attempt was made to exhaust the post-1941 cases, this compar-
ison may not be significant. A more meaningful comparison, however, may be
made in North Carolina and Texas, where we have attempted to exhaust the
reported cases, both pre-1942 and post-1941.
In North Carolina we found only four labor-injunction cases prior to
1942.134 The trial courts issued injunctive relief in all four. We found sixteen
post-1941 injunction cases. The trial courts granted relief in fifteen and denied
it in one. The proportions were thus much the same in both periods.
The proportions were different in Texas, the only southern state with a
substantial amount of labor litigation. Of thirty-one pre-1942 applications,
trial courts granted injunctive relief in eighteen cases (fifty-eight percent), and
denied it in thirteen (forty-two percent). The proportion of grants to denials
increased in the post-1941 period. We found thirty-two reported applications
for injunctive relief after 1941. Trial courts granted relief in twenty-four (sev-
enty-five percent) and denied it in eight (twenty-five percent) of these cases.
A closer look at the Texas cases seems in order, since it is the most indus-
trialized state of the South and one of the most heavily organized. Viewed in
the light of the state's reputation, the Texas labor-injunction cases contain
some surprises.
Of the thirty-one pre-1942 applications, fourteen were by employers. 13 5
Of the remaining seventeen, one was a suit by a union against an employer for
134. Asheville Times Co. v. Asheville Typographical Union, No. 263, 187 N.C. 157, 121 S.E.
37 (1924); Citizens Co. v. Asheville Typographical Union, No. 263, 187 N.C. 42, 121 S.E. 31
(1924); McGinnis v. Raleigh Typographical Union, No. 54, 182 N.C. 770, 108 S.E. 728 (1921);
Marion Mfg. Co. v. United Textile Workers (N.C. Super. Ct., McDowell County, July 24, 1929)
(see D. McCRAcKEN, supra note 41, at 79). These early North Carolina cases are extensively
reviewed in D. MCCRACKEN, supra note 41, at 49-93. Although McCracken seems to have been
impressed by the Frankfurter and Greene belief that "government by injunction" prevailed in
labor disputes generally (see generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
(1930)), he said that "[g]overnment by injunction ... was not found in any of the North Carolina
and Virginia Cases." D. McCRAcKEN, supra note 41, at 136.
135. Exparte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335, 220 S.W. 75 (1920); Sheehan v. Levy, 238 S.W. 900 (rex.
App. Comm'n 1922); The Fair, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 131, 157 S.W.2d 716 (rex. Civ. App.
1941); Borden Co. v. Local 133, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 152 S.W.2d 828 (rex. Civ. App. 1941);
Tipton v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 808, 149 S.W.2d 1028 (rex. Civ. App. 1941);
Carpenters Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 149 S.W.2d 694 (rex. Civ. App. 1941), aft'd, 315 U.S. 722
(1942); San Angelo v. Meat Cutters Local 103, 139 S.W.2d 843 (rex. Civ. App. 1940); Carter v.
Bradshaw, 138 S.W.2d 187 (rex. Civ. App. 1940); Henke & Pillot, Inc. v. Meat Cutters No. 408,
109 S.W.2d 1083 (rex. Civ. App. 1937); Culinary Workers' No. 331 v. Fuller, 105 S.W.2d 295
(rex. Civ. App. 1937); ILGWU Local 123 v. Dorothy Frocks Co., 95 S.W.2d 1346 (rex. Civ. App.
1936); Cooks' Local Union v. Papageorge, 230 S.W. 1086 (rex. Civ. App. 1921); Webb v. Cooks'
No. 748, 205 S.W. 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
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specific enforcement of a closed-shop agreement; 136 five were suits by unions
against employees or other unions; 137 four were suits by unions against munic-
ipal officials 138 and police;139 and the remaining seven were suits by individ-
ual employees against their unions or against unions and employers as
codefendants.140
The trial courts granted relief in eight of the employer suits141 and denied
it in six.142 On appeal the grants were affirmed in seven cases143 and vacated
in one.144 The appellate courts affirmed the denials of relief to employers in
all six cases.145
In the single application by a union against an employer, the relief sought
was granted and affirmed. 146 Unions were largely successful in their other
applications for injunctive relief as well. In the four applications against other
unions, although the trial courts granted the relief sought in two 147 and denied
136. Harper v. Local 520, IBEW, 48 S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
137. Motion Picture & Vitaphone Operators No. 56,880 v. Motion Picture Operators Local
305, 132 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Carpenters No. 213 v. Carpenters Union, 110 S.W.2d
1209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Henke & Pillot, Inc. v. Meat Cutters No. 408, 109 S.W.2d 1083 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937); Machinists Local 1488 v. Federated Ass'n of Accessory Workers, 109 S.W.2d 301
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937), case dismrissedas moot, 133 Tex. 624, 130 S.W.2d 282 (1939); Thomas v.
International Seamen's Union, 101 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
138. Fire Fighter's Local 84 v. Bell, 223 S.W. 506 (rex. Civ. App. 1920); McNatt v. Lawther,
223 S.W. 503 (rex. Civ. App. 1920).
139. Gurtov v. Williams, 105 S.W.2d 328 (rex. Civ. App. 1937); Thomas v. International
Seamen's Union, 101 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
140. Dallas Photo-Engravers Local 38 v. Lemmon, 148 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Johnson, 133 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Price, 126 S.W.2d 74 (rex. Civ. App. 1939); Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive
Eng'rs v. Marshall, 119 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Longshoremen's Local 329 v. Williams,
102 S.W.2d 1072 (rex. Civ. App. 1937); Hunt v. Dunlap, 248 S.W. 760 (rex. Civ. App. 1923);
Underwood v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 178 S.W. 38 (rex. Civ. App. 1915).
141. Carpenters & Joiners Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942), af'g 149 S.W.2d
694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Borden Co. v. Local 133, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 152 S.W.2d 828 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941); Carter v. Bradshaw, 138 S.W.2d 187 (rex. Civ. App. 1940); Culinary Workers'
No. 331 v. Fuller, 105 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Garment Workers Local 123 v. Dorothy
Frocks Co., 95 S.W.2d 1346 (rex. Civ. App. 1936); Cooks' Local Union v. Papageorge, 230 S.W.
1086 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Exparte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335, 220 S.W. 75 (1920); Webb v. Cooks'
No. 748, 205 S.W. 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
142. Sheehan v. Levy, 238 S.W. 900 (Tex. App. Comm'n 1922); The Fair, Inc., v. Retail Clerks
Local 131, 157 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Borden Co. v. Local 133, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters, 152 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Tipton & Restaurant Employees Local 808, 149
S.W.2d 1028 (rex. Civ. App. 1941); San Angelo v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 103, 139
S.W.2d 843 (rex. Civ. App. 1940); Henke & Pillot, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters No. 408,
109 S.W.2d 1083 (rex. Civ. App. 1937).
143. Borden Co. v. Local 133, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 152 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941);
Carpenters Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 149 S.W.2d 694 (rex. Civ. App. 1941), a'd, 315 U.S. 722
(1942); Carter v. Bradshaw, 138 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Culinary Workers No. 331 v.
Fuller, 105 S.W.2d 295 (rex. Civ. App. 1937); ILGWU Local 123 v. Dorothy Frocks Co., 95
S.W.2d 1346 (rex. Civ. App. 1936); Cooks' Local Union v. Papageorge, 230 S.W. 1086 (rex. Civ.
App. 1921).
144. Exparle Tucker, 110 Tex. 335, 220 S.W. 75 (1920).
145. See cases cited supra note 142.
146. Harper v. Local 520, IBEW, 48 S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
147. Motion Picture & Vitaphone Operators No. 56,880 v. Motion Picture Operators Local
305, 132 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Machinists Local 1488 v. Federated Ass'n of Acces-
sory Workers, 109 S.W.2d 301 (rex. Civ. App. 1937), dismissed as moot, 133 Tex. 624, 130 S.W.2d
282 (1939).
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it in two, 148 on appeal the grants were affirmed in both cases and one denial
was reversed.' 49 Thus, unions eventually secured relief in three of the four
cases against other unions. In the one case in which a union sought injunctive
relief against employees (wildcat strikers), the relief was granted and affirmed
as modified.150 Summarized, unions sought injunctive relief against employ-
ers, other unions, or employees in six cases and secured it in five. Employers
sought relief in fourteen cases and ultimately secured it in seven. Unions thus
won eighty-three percent of their cases while employers won fifty percent.
Unions were less successful in suits against municipal authorities but
more successful in suits for injunctive relief against police harassment. In two
suits challenging the authority of cities to discharge unionists, relief was de-
nied in both cases, and the denials were affirmed.151 However, both suits
against police harassment were successful on appeal as well as in the trial
courts.
15 2
Employee suits, mainly against unions, were the least successful of all in
Texas. Employees brought five suits for injunctive relief against their unions.
While they were successful in the trial courts, the injunctions were vacated by
appellate courts in all five cases.153 They brought two suits against employers
and unions jointly. Both were unsuccessful in the trial courts as well as on
appeal.' 54
It is difficult to perceive any sign of anti-union bias in the foregoing data.
On the contrary, the tendency of the Texas courts to grant injunctive relief in
suits by unions and to deny it in suits by employees against their unions sug-
gests institutional acceptance of unions by the courts. The relatively poor rec-
ord of employers in injunction suits against union suggest the same thing.
Largely the same inference is suggested by the pre-1942 career of the la-
bor injunction in the other southern courts. In Alabama, for example, trial
courts denied injunctive relief in both of the cases in which it was sought prior
to 1942. In one the denial was affirmed, in the other reversed. Nothing sub-
stantially different is observable in any of the other southern states. Except for
Texas, few labor injunctions were either sought or granted before 1942 in the
148. Carpenters No. 213 v. Carpenters Union, 110 S.W.2d 1209 (rex. Civ. App. 1937); Henke
& Pillot, Inc. v. Meat Cutters No. 408, 109 S.W.2d 1083 (rex. Civ. App. 1937) (injunction denied
to one party and granted to another).
149. Henke & Pillot, Inc. v. Meat Cutters No. 408, 109 S.W.2d 1083 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937)
(injunction denied to one party and granted to another).
150. Thomas v. International Seamen's Union, 101 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
151. Fire Fighters' Local 84 v. Bell, 223 S.W. 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); McNatt v. Lawther,
223 S.W. 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
152. Gurtov v. Williams, 105 S.W.2d 328 (rex. Civ. App. 1937); Risager v. Baker, decidedsub
nom. Thomas v. International Seaman's Union, 101 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
153. Photo-Engravers' Local No. 38 v. Lemmon, 148 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Johnson, 133 S.W.2d 182 (rex. Civ. App. 1939); Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Price, 126 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive
Eng'rs v. Marshall, 119 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Longshoremen's Local 329 v. Williams,
102S.W.2d 1072 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
154. Hunt v. Dunlap, 248 S.W. 760 (rex. Civ. App. 1923); Underwood v. Texas & Pac. Ry.,
178 S.W. 38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
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southern states. The most extreme state was South Carolina, where there does
not seem to have been any significant use of the labor injunction at all, either
before or after 1942.
To this writer, at any rate, the litigation record after 1941 does not differ
significantly from that of the pre-1942 period, except insofar as the U.S.
Supreme Court's preemption doctrine added a new element. Although the
southern trial courts seem to have granted a greater proportion of the applica-
tions for injunctive relief after 1941 (eighty-two percent) than they had earlier
(sixty-seven percent), we cannot be sure that this proportion would continue if
we exhausted the cases. Again, although the proportion of injunctions vacated
after 1941 (eighteen percent) seems small compared "to the proportion vacated
before 1942 (thirty-one percent), it must be remembered that five of the pre-
1942 injunctions vacated, in Texas alone, were in suits by employees against
their unions. That type of suit, and that type of disposition by the courts,
contribute very little to resolution of the question whether the southern courts
were or are anti-union. If they were eliminated from the pre-1942 cases, the
proportions both before and after that year would differ little.
In any endeavor to determine whether or not the southern courts were
motivated by anti-union sentiment in the disposition of petitions for injunctive
relief in labor disputes, the views they expressed on the propriety of injunctive
relief in such disputes ought not to be ignored. We now turn to a survey of
those views.
B. The Southern Courts' Views on the Propriety of Injunctive Relief in
Labor Disputes and on the Preemption Doctrine
With the labor injunction a relatively undeveloped institution in the
South before 1942 and largely so even thereafter, it should not be surprising
that southern judges made virtually no contribution to the controversy over
"government by injunction." 155 Unions and their academic protagonists
could scarcely complain about southern judges when in the entire period
before 1942 only forty-eight labor injunctions had been reported in the
South,156 especially since many of those were granted to unions and employ-
155. For a compendium of the crusade agaist "government by injunction," see F. FRANK-
FURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 134; for a critique of that book and of the crusade as a whole,
see Petro, supra note 7.
156. State v. Kansas & T. Coal Co., 96 F. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1899), rev'd, 183 U.S. 185 (1901);
Riggs v. Tucker Duck & Rubber Co., 196 Ark. 571, 119 S.W.2d 507 (1938); Jones v. State, 170
Ark. 863, 281 S.W. 663 (1926); Local 313, Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Stathakis, 135 Ark.
86, 205 S.W. 405 (1918); Retail Clerks Local 779 v. Lerner Shops, 140 Fla. 865, 193 So. 2d 529
(1940); Weissman v. Jureit, 132 Fla. 661, 181 So. 898 (1938); Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather,
53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907); O'Jay Spread Co. v. Hicks, 185 Ga. 507, 195 S.E. 564 (1938);
Edrington v. Hall, 168 Ga. 484, 148 S.E. 403 (1929); McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., 151 Ga.
776, 108 S.E. 226 (1921); Callan v. Exposition Cotton Mills, 149 Ga. 119, 99 S.E. 300 (1919);
Burgess v. Georgia, F. & A. Ry., 148 Ga. 417, 96 S.E. 865 (1918); Holmes v. Brown, 146 Ga. 402,
91 S.E. 408 (1917); Jones v. Van Winkle Gin & Mach. Works, 131 Ga. 336, 62 S.E. 236 (1908);
Employing Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S.E. 353 (1905); Dehan v. Hotel
& Restaurant Employees Local 183, 159 So. 637 (La. 1935); Local 1226, Int'l Longshoremen's
Ass'n v. Ross, 180 La. 293, 156 So. 357 (1934); Keegan v. Board of Comm'rs, 154 La. 639, 98 So.
50 (1923); Schneider v. Journeymen Plumbers, 116 La. 270,40 So. 700 (1906); Mississippi Theatres
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ees. Moreover, after 1942 constitutional doctrines developed by the United
States Supreme Court severely restricted the labor injunction in all state
courts, southern and northern. The southern courts accepted this preemption
of their authority to prevent irreparable injury without any notable resistance.
The propriety of equitable relief in labor disputes was therefore rarely
contested seriously in the southern cases on general principles, although there
were arguments against relief based on the facts of a given case. When con-
tested, the general propriety of equitable relief was upheld. For example, the
contention that equitable relief in labor disputes should be withheld when the
conduct enjoined also constituted a crime was curtly dismissed in an early
Alabama case.157 Similarly, the argument that equitable relief should be con-
fined to cases involving rights in real property was rejected without much dis-
cussion.158 Probably reflecting widespread judicial sentiment, North and
South,159 the Louisiana courts held unconstitutional a state anti-injunction act
similar to the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act, 160 on the theory that authority to
issue injunctive relief in proper cases is inherent in judicial power. 161
Corp. v. Hattiesburg Local 615, 174 Miss. 439, 164 So. 887 (1936); Chambers v. Davis, 128 Miss.
613, 91 So. 346 (1922); Asheville Times v. Asheville Typographical Union, No. 263, 187 N.C. 157,
121 S.E. 37 (1924); Citizens Co. v. Asheville Typographical Union, No. 263, 187 N.C. 42, 121 S.E.
31 (1924); McGinnis v. Raleigh TypographicalUnion, No. 54, 182 N.C. 770, 108 S.E. 728 (1921);
Marion Mfg. Co. v. United Textile Workers (N.C. Super. Ct., McDowell County, July 24, 1929)
(unreported but text of complaining order in D. MCCRACKEN, spra note 41, at 215); Lichter v.
Fulcher, 22 Tenn. App. 670, 125 S.W.2d 501, cert. denied, - Tenn. -, - S.W.2d - (1939);
American Glanzstoff Corp. v. Miller (Tenn. Ch. 1929) (reviewed in D. McCRACKEN, supra note
39, at 94-113) (no further citation available); Marshall v. City of Nashville, 109 Tenn. 495, 71 S.W.
815 (1903); Borden Co. v. Local 133, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 152 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941) (counts as two cases because injunction granted to one party and denied to another);
Carpenters Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 149 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), aj'd, 315 U.S. 722
(1942); Photo-Engravers' Local 38 v. Lemmon, 148 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Carter v.
Bradshaw, 138 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Brotherhood of Trainmen v. Johnson, 133
S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Brotherhood of Trainmen v. Price, 126 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939); Motion Picture & Vitaphone Operators No. 56,880 v. Motion Picture Operators Local
305, 132 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Marshall,
119 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Machinists Local 1488 v. Federated Ass'n of Accessory
Workers, 109 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), dismissed as moot, 133 Tex. 624, 130 S.W.2d 282
(1939); Thomas v. International Seaman's Union, 101 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (two
cases); Longshoremen's Local 329 v. Williams, 102 S.W.2d 1072 (rex. Civ. App. 1937); Culinary
Workers No. 331 v. Fuller, 105 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); ILGWU Local 123 v. Dorothy
Frocks Co., 95 S.W.2d 1346 (rex. Civ. App. 1936); Harper v. Local 520, IBEW, 48 S.W.2d 1033
(rex. Civ. App. 1932); Cooks' Local Union v. Papageorge, 230 S.W. 1086 (rex. Civ. App. 1921);
Exparte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335, 220 S.W. 75 (1920); Webb v. Cooks' No. 748, 205 S.W. 465 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1918); Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Gorman (Va. Corp. Ct., Danville, Sept.
30, 1930) (not reported but facts and ruling available in D. MCCRACKEN, supra note 41, at 114-
26); Waddey v. Richmond Typographical Union No. 90, 105 Va. 188, 53 S.E. 273 (1906).
157. E.g., Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruse, 189 Ala. 66, 80-81, 66 So. 657, 662 (1914); Jones v.
E. Van Winkle Gin & Mach. Works, 131 Ga. 336, 339, 62 S.E. 236, 238 (1908).
158. E.g., Carter v. Bradshaw, 138 S.W.2d 187, 190-91 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
159. For a few examples of restrictive interpretations of state anti-injunction acts by courts in
such "liberal" states as New York and Wisconsin, see Opera on Tour v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34
N.E.2d 349 (1941); Thompson v. Boekhout, 249 App. Div. 77, 291 N.Y.S. 572 (1936), afi'd, 273
N.Y. 390, 7 N.E.2d 764 (1937); AJ. Monday Co. v. Automobile Workers, Local 25, 17 Wis. 532,
177 N.W. 867 (1920).
160. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1976).
161. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co. v. United Mine Workers, 227 La. 1109, 81 So. 2d 413 (1955),
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 351 U.S. 62 (1956); Twiggs v. Journeyman Barbers Local
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The southern courts upheld the propriety of injunctive relief in cases in
which unions sought such relief as readily as when employers did, indeed per-
haps more readily. Thus the courts of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas all
granted unions specific performance of compulsory-unionism contracts against
defaulting employers.' 62 In order to evaluate properly these decisions, one
must remember that such relief is the most extreme type awarded by equity
courts; it is a species of mandatory injunction, ordering the employer to make
employment contracts with union members. No case has ever been found in
which union members have been compelled by a court of equity to make, or
even to perform, an employment contract with a private employer. Upon oc-
casion, American courts have ordered government employees to abandon ille-
gal strikes and to return to work, 163 but that is as far as they have gone. Such
being the case, complaints by unionists of "government by injunction" have an
odd ring to them when made about any American court, North or South.
The way appellate courts dealt with petitions for injunctive relief by
members against their unions, usually in expulsion cases, again suggests the
absence of anti-union animus. For example, in each case in which Texas trial
courts granted union members the relief they sought, appellate courts vacated
the injunctions or writs of mandamus, usually on the ground that the petition-
ers failed to exhaust the remedies provided by the unions' internal proce-
dures.164 Certainly if southern courts had had leanings toward "government
by injunction" these employee suits would have provided strong bases for eq-
uitable intervention. Instead, the courts chose to apply to unions generally the
rule of exhaustion developed in cases involving the internal disputes of genu-
inely voluntary associations,' 65 despite the monopolistic and coercive tenden-
cies of American trade unions.
Further evidence of the moderation of the southern courts is seen in their
attitudes toward and reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court's preemption doc-
trine. I do not believe it possible to exaggerate the noxious and inequitable
features of that doctrine.' 66 Yet, although the inequities and iniquities of pre-
496, 57 So. 2d 803 (La. App. 1952). Compare Dehan v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 183,
159 So. 637 (La. App. 1935) (upholding the Louisiana anti-injunction act).
162. Baton Rouge Bldg. Trades Council v. T.L. James & Co., 201 La. 749, 10 So. 2d 606
(1942); Mississippi Theatres Corp. v. Hattiesburg Local 615, 174 Miss. 439, 164 So. 887 (1936);
Harper v. Local 520, IBEW, 48 S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
163. E.g., Pinellas County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 214 So. 2d
34 (Fla. 1968); City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 Ill. 2d 547, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974). See also United
Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C.) aj'd, 404 U.S. 805 (1971).
164. Photo-Engravers' No. 38 v. Lemmon, 148 S.W.2d 954 (rex. Civ. App. 1941); Brother-
hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Johnson, 133 S.W.2d 182 (rex. Civ. App. 1939); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Price, 126 S.W.2d 74 (rex. Civ. App. 1939); Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v.
Marshall, 119 S.W.2d 908 (rex. Civ. App. 1938); Longshoremen's Local 329 v. Williams, 102
S.W.2d 1072 (rex. Civ. App. 1937).
165. See generall Sturges, UnfncorporatedAssociations Parties to Actions, 33 YALE L.J. 383
(1924).
166. If the kinds of actionable wrongs committed by trade unions constitute cases par excel-
lence for equitable remedies, as I believe (see Petro, supra note 7, at 364-83), what I wrote twenty-
one years ago about the preemption doctrine is relevant to our assessment of the temper and
character of the southern courts:
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emption were particularly blatant in numerous southern cases, as a general
rule the southern courts silently accepted the U.S. Supreme Court's preemp-
tion of their equitable powers.167 Only rarely did a southern judge express his
resentments, as Judge Denny did in a North Carolina decision refusing to dis-
miss an action for damages brought by an employee against a union for viola-
tion of the North Carolina right to work law after the NLRB declined to
prosecute the case:
It is quite clear, since the NLRB had declined to exercise juris-
diction in this case, if the courts of this State are not open for the
adjudication of the plaintiff's claim for damages in tort, based on his
wrongful discharge, pursuant to the provisions of our Right to Work
Act, then there is no forum in either the federal or state judicial sys-
tems where the plaintiff can have his rights litigated and determined.
This runs counter to our conception ofjustice and it makes no differ-
ence whether Congress intended to permit the creation of this no-
man's-land by giving the NLRB exclusive jurisdiction on the one
hand, but not requiring its exericse on the other, or whether this vac-
uum has been the result of judicial interpretation is beside the point,
such a situation affecting the rights of so many employers and em-
ployees ought not to be permitted to continue. Congress ought to
What, then, is to be said in favor of the preemption doctrine? It has no constitu-
tional basis; it has no statutory basis. If one wishes to analyze practical consequences,
the preemption doctrine looks even worse than it does when exposed to purely legal
considerations. [The preemption doctrine has produced] a series of catastrophic and de-
structive miscarriages of justice. Preemption has permitted unions in hundreds of cases
to coerce employees, contrary to the policy of federal and state law. Some employers
have been forced out of business. Thousands of employees have been forced to pay
tribute to unions which they do not want. The appalling disclosures of the McClellan
Committee can be traced back in many cases to the privileged sanctuary afforded thugs
and crooks by the preemption doctrine.
The truth of the matter is that the preemption doctrine-not the participation of
state courts in adjudicating unfair practice cases-is frustrating national purposes. Es-
tablishing justice was one of the principal goals of the people of the United States in
adopting the Constitution and remains today one of our most exigent problems. The
state courts could play an extremely important part in securing that great objective. In
ousting them, with no constitutional or statutory basis for the ouster, the Supreme Court
is merely the dupe of those who seek to evade the law. The trade unions have argued for
preemption because each case they win gives them the privilege to violate both state and
federal law. They have not been advancing the preemption theory because they are
dedicated to the enforcement of the Taft--rartley Act. -For them, that moderate and
minimal attempt to apply a few decent rules to trade-union aggression is a "slave labor
law." Preemption is their device for securing from the Supreme Court an immunity
which neither the Constitution nor the Congress would afford them.
Petro, Labor Relations Law, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 733, 740-41 (1960) (footnote omitted).
167. See, eg., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369
(1969), rev'g 201 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); ILGWU Local 415 v. Scherer & Sons, 390
U.S 717 (1968), revkper curiara, 188 So. 2d 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Expare George, 371
U.S. 72 (1962), vacating & remandingper curiam, 163 Tex. 103, 358 S.W.2d 590 (1962); Teamsters
Local 327 v. Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc., 353 U.S. 968 (1957), rev'g Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc. v.
Cook Truck Lines, Inc., 41 Tenn. App. 467, 296 S.W.2d 379 (1956); Electrical Workers Local 429
v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 353 U.S. 969 (1957), revkper curiam 201 Tenn. 329,299 S.W.2d 8
(1957). See also Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963), rev'v 355
S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (the Supreme Court preempting a damages judgment affirmed
by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals); Wiggins & Co. v. Retail Clerks Local 1557, 595 S.W.2d 802
(1980); Expare Twedell, 158 Tex. 214, 309 S.W.2d 834 (1958).
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correct it. Unnecessary delay in correcting such a situation in the
field of labor-management relations is indefensible. A citizen,
whether employer or employee, is entitled to his day in court if his
rights have been infringed upon contrary to law.
Our courts, in the case before us, are not seeking to administer
the provisions of. . . the Labor Relations Act. . .; they seek only to
enforce the provisions of our own Right to Work Act, provisions
which have no counterpart in the National Labor Relations Act.
Moreover, this Court does not seek to evade any clear mandate
of the Supreme Court of the United States, whether it agrees with
that Court's opinions or not. . . . On the other hand, we do not
hasten to surrender voluntarily any right which we believe we have
both the legal right and duty to uphold and enforce.
As heretofore pointed out, our Right to Work Act has been held
to be constitutional by this Court and by the Supreme Court of the
United States. . . . Certainly, Congress did not undertake to pro-
vide for the adjustment of unfair labor practices applicable exclu-
sively to intrastate business.1 68
Our brief review here demonstrates that if the southern courts thought
there was nothing inherently wrong with the labor injunction they at least ap-
plied their conviction evenhandedly to all petitioners for such relief. Certainly
there is no evidence that southern judges were passionately in favor of grant-
ing injunctive relief in labor cases. "Dispassionate" would more accurately
denote the attitudes that their decisions display. Had they been imbued with
any anti-union passion, it is hardly likely that they would have accepted the
U.S. Supreme Court's preemption doctrine without any real objection. In any
event, there is no indication so far in the cases that the southern courts were
either more anti-union or anti-preemption than their northern brethren were.
C Equity Procedures and Practices in the Southern Courts Injunctions as
"Strike-Defeating" Measures
1. Interlocutory Relief and Labor Disputes
The idea that the southern courts had an anti-union bent can perhaps best
be tested by looking at how they exercised the discretion inherent in standard
equity procedures and practices in the labor-injunction cases. However,
before reviewing the cases, they need to be placed in factual and legal context.
First, although employers were most frequently complainants and unions
most frequently respondents or defendants in southern labor-injunction cases,
as they were in the northern cases, the labor injunction was by no means
strictly an employer device. In Texas, for example, of sixty-three labor-injunc-
tion cases, forty-two were brought by employers, 169 twelve by unions, 170 and
168. Willard v. Huffinan, 250 N.C. 396, 408-09, 109 S.E.2d 233, 242 (1959). For a similar
interpretation by a Tennessee judge, see Pruitt v. Lambert, 34 Lab. Cas. 95929, 95939-40 (Tenn.
Ch. 1957).
169. Millwrights Local 2484 v. Rust Eng'r Co., 433 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. 1968); Exparte George,
163 Tex. 103, 358 S.W.2d 590 (1962), vacated, 371 U.S. 72 (1963) (per curiam); Expare Dilley,
[Vol. 59
1981] UNIONS AND THE SOUTHERN COURTS 895
nine by employees.' 7 1 As we saw in the preceding section, unions won a
greater proportion of their cases than either employers or employees did. Indi-
160 Tex. 522, 334 S.W.2d 425 (1960); Exparte Twedell, 158 Tex. 214, 309 S.W.2d 834 (1958);
Dallas Gen. Drivers v. Wamix, Inc., 156 Tex. 408, 295 S.W.2d 873 (1956); Cain, Brogden & Cain,
Inc. v. Local 47, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 155 Tex. 304, 285 S.W.2d 942 (1956); Truck Drivers
Local 941 v. Whitfield Transp., Inc., 154 Tex. 91, 273 S.W.2d 857 (1954); Texas Foundaries [sic],
Inc. v. International Molders Union, 151 Tex. 239, 248 S.W.2d 460 (1952); Best Motor Lines v.
Teamsters Local 745, 150 Tex. 95, 237 S.W.2d 589 (1951); Construction Local 688 v. Stephenson,
148 Tex. 434, 225 S.W.2d 958 (1950); Operating Eng'rs Local 564 v. Cox, 148 Tex. 42, 219 S.W.2d
787 (1949); North E. Tex. Motor Lines, Inc. v. Dickson, 148 Tex. 35, 219 S.W.2d 795 (1949); Ex
parle Henry, 147 Tex. 315, 215 S.W.2d 588 (1948); Exparte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335, 220 S.W. 75
(1920); Sheehan v. Levy, 238 S.W. 900 (rex. Comm'n App. 1922); Western Hills Theaters, Inc. v.
Motion Picture Operators Local 330, 495 S.W.2d 39 (rex. Civ. App. 1973); Farah Mfg. Co. v.
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 483 S.W.2d 271 (rex. Civ. App. 1972); Sabine Area Bldg.
Trades Council v. Temple Assoc., Inc., 468 S.W.2d 501 (rex. Civ. App. 1971); United Farm
Workers Organizing Comm. v. La Casita Farms, Inc., 439 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968);
Geissler v. Coussoulis, 424 S.W.2d 709 (rex. Civ. App. 1967); Office Employees Local 129 v.
Houston Lighting & Power Co., 314 S.W.2d 315 (rex. Civ. App. 1958); Texas State Optical v.
Optical Workers 24859, 257 S.W.2d 493 (rex. Civ. App. 1953); Texas State Fed'n of Labor v.
Brown & Root, Inc., 246 S.W.2d 938 (rex. Civ. App. 1952); General Drivers Local 745 v. Dallas
County Constr. Employers' Ass'n, 246 S.W.2d 677 (rex. Civ. App. 1951); Sheet Metal Workers
Local 175 v. Walker, 236 S.W.2d 683 (rex. Civ. App. 1951); Alamo Motor Lines, Inc. v. Teamsters
Local 657, 229 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Teamsters Local 393 v. Missouri Pac. Freight
Transp. Co., 220 S.W.2d 219 (rex. Civ. App. 1949); Turner v. Zanes, 206 S.W.2d 144 (rex. Civ.
App. 1947); General Drivers Local 745 v. Oak Cliff Baking Co., 203 S.W.2d 586 (rex. Civ. App.
1947); Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Int'l Alliance v. Langley, 160 S.W.2d 124 (rex. Civ. App.
1942); The Fair, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 131, 157 S.W.2d 716 (rex. Civ. App. 1941); Borden
Co. v. Local 133, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 152 S.W.2d 828 (rex. Civ. App. 1941) (two employer
plaintiffs); Tipton v. Hotel Employees Local 808, 149 S.W.2d 1028 (rex. Civ. App. 1941);
Carpenters Local 213 v. Ritter's Cae, 149 S.W.2d 694 (rex. Civ. App. 1941), aqJd 315 U.S. 722
(1942); San Angelo v. Meat Cutters Local 103, 139 S.W.2d 843 (rex. Civ. App. 1940); Carter v.
Bradshaw, 138 S.W.2d 187 (rex. Civ. App. 1940); Henke & Pillot, Inc. v. Meat Cutters No. 408,
109 S.W.2d 1083 (rex. Civ. App. 1937); Culinary Workers' No. 331 v. Fuller, 105 S.W.2d 295
(rex. Civ. App. 1937); ILGWU Local 123 v. Dorothy Frocks Co., 95 S.W.2d 1346 (rex. Civ. App.
1936); Cooks' Local Union v. Papageorge, 230 S.W. 1086 (rex. Civ. App. 1921); Webb v. Cooks'
No. 748, 205 S.W. 465 (rex. Civ. App. 1918).
170. IBEW Local 278 v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 498 S.W.2d 504 (rex. Civ. App. 1973) (to
enforce pro-union ordinance); AFL v. Mann, 188 S.W.2d 276 (rex. Civ. App. 1945) (declaratory
relief against statute); Motion Picture & Vitaphone Operators No. 56,880 v. Motion Picture Oper-
ators Local 305, 132 S.W.2d 299 (rex. Civ. App. 1939) (by white labor union to enjoin black labor
union from picketing to induce employer to hire black employees); Carpenters No. 213 v.
Carpenters Union, 110 S.W.2d 1209 (rex. Civ. App. 1937) (against another union for "trademark"
violation-use of similar name); Henke & Pillot, Inc. v. Meat Cutters No. 408, 109 S.W.2d 1083
(rex. Civ. App. 1937) (against another union's picketing which interfered with employment con-
tract); Machinists Local 1488 v. Federated Ass'n of Accessory Workers, 109 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1937), dirmissed as moot, 133 Tex. 624, 130 S.W.2d 282 (1939) (against another union for
picketing); Gurtov v. Williams, 105 S.W.2d 328 (rex. Civ. App. 1937) (to enjoin policemen from
arresting union members as vagrants, when policemen knew they were not); Thomas v. Interna-
tional Seamen's Union, 101 S.W.2d 328 (rex. Civ. App. 1937) (two actions: (1) to restrain certain
persons from striking in the name of the union, and (2) to enjoin police from arresting or interfer-
ing with peaceful pickets); Harper v. Local 520, IBEW, 48 S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (to
enforce employment contract); Fire Fighters' Local 84 v. Bell, 223 S.W. 506 (rex. Civ. App. 1920)
(to enjoin city officers from discharging firemen for belonging to union); McNatt v. Lawther, 223
S.W. 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) (for reinstatement of firemen discharged for striking).
171. Lundine v. McKinney, 183 S.W.2d 265 (rex. Civ. App. 1944); Watson v. Missouri-Kan.-
Tex. R.R., 173 S.W.2d 357 (rex. Civ. App. 1943); Dallas Photo-Engravers' Local 38 v. Lemmon,
148 S.W.2d 954 (rex. Civ. App. 1941); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Johnson, 133 S.W.2d 182
(rex. Civ. App. 1939); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Price, 126 S.W.2d 74 (rex. Civ. App.
1939); Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Marshall, 119 S.W.2d 908 (rex. Civ. App. 1938);
Longshoremen's Local 329 v. Williams, 102 S.W.2d 1072 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Hunt v. Dunlap,
248 S.W. 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Underwood v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 178 S.W. 38 (rex. Civ. App.
1915).
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vidual employees, usually suing unions, lost most frequently. At the outset,
therefore, accusations of anti-unionism in the southern courts must cope with
the success of unions as both plaintiffs and defendants.
Second, the common union complaint that injunctions were "strike-de-
feating" instruments of exploitative employers served by compliant judges 172
must be evaluated in light of the reality that in many labor-injunction cases,
North and South, there was no strike at all, or that what was called a strike
actually involved an attempt by a union to induce or to force unwilling em-
ployees to strike. 173 The fact that northern and southern courts rarely en-
joined strikes casts further doubt on the validity of this complaint. 174
Third, if "strike injunctions" really do not enjoin strikes at all, but only
the coercive activities accompanying strikes, such as mass picketing, violence,
vandalism, and intimidation, then it cannot be that the injunction defeats the
strike. If only coercion is prohibited by an injunction, then-even assuming
that the injunction is effectively policed and enforced175-it is not really the
injunction that "defeats" the strike but the free choices of employees. 176 In-
junctions in the private sector do not force workers to take jobs vacated by
strikers, or strikers to return to work. When strikes are defeated, it is the mar-
ket, the free choice of employees, that defeats them. Even ardent unionists
have occasionally admitted this.177
Nevertheless, the contention that "injunctions defeat strikes" was
designed to play, and often did play, an extraordinarily significant role in de-
termining whether or not injunctive relief should be issued in suits by employ-
ers. When unionists joined with this contention the further one that the labor
injunction tended to "resolve" labor disputes in favor of employers upon inad-
equate evidence, which is usually all that a court has before it at the early,
interlocutory stages of an equity case, 178 they induced judges to lean over
backwards to avoid the appearance of being pro-employer.
172. This thesis was extensively developed in F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION 105-33, 200-05 (1930). See also J. FREY, THE LABOR INJUNCTION: AN EXPOSITION
OF GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIAL CONSCIENCE AND ITS MENACE (1923). The literature pro and con
on the labor injunction is enormous. For further citations and discussion, see Petro, supra note 7,
at notes 4, 33, 41, 47, 53-55 and accompanying text.
173. See Petro, supra note 7, at 451-55.
174. Id. at 449-51.
175. Effective policing of picket lines and injunctions may be more the exception than the rule.
See Note, The Enforcement of the Right ofAccess in Mass Picketing Situations, 113 U. PA. L. REV.
111 (1964) for a similar opinion.
176. Professor McCracken, who thought injunctions were largely ineffectual, also implied that
they might increase union solidarity among employees. See D. MCCRACKEN, supra note 41, at
141-43.
177. D. MCCRACKEN, supra note 41, at 137, quotes a union official as saying that "strikes
break themselves" when called in economic conditions which make success improbable. I believe
it both more true and more significant to say that unions use coercive measures so often in connec-
tion with strikes because they tend to call strikes during unpropitious economic conditions. Going
further, I believe that most employers are aware enough of economic conditions to pay what is
required to avoid strike threats, so that strikes and strike threats are almost predictably unjustified
by market conditions. See in this connection a brilliant but as yet unpublished work by W. HUTrr,
LABOR'S DISADVANTAGE.
178. See Petro, supra note 7, at 436-41.
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Let us observe the process more closely in relation to standard equity
procedure. In the typical labor-injunction case, an employer complains to a
judge of illegal union conduct and irreparable injury, and supports his com-
plaint with affidavits stating that the illegal conduct (picketing, boycott, vio-
lence, vandaliam, intimidation) is either occurring or is threatened; the prayer
is for immediate relief. The employer's irreparable injury charges in the past
would emphasize that unions were not legal entitites and therefore could not
be made to respond in damages, or that the union was insolvent; now employ-
ers will charge that it is impossible to quantify in monetary terms lost profits,
reduced customer good will, and other such intangible harms.
The union will usually challenge the charge of illegality and deny the
factual charges. To the employer's contention that withholding relief will
cause him great harm, the union may reply that a grant of relief, without proof
that unlawful acts have actually occurred, will create great institutional harm
for the union, loss of employee support, demoralization, embarrassment in the
community, and so on.
What is a court of equity to do with the "equities" in this posture? The
response of equity in cases not involving labor disputes is summed up in two
ideas: the prima facie case and the relative hardship test. When a petitioner
for temporary injunctive relief comes into court alleging that the respondent is
engaging in unlawful conduct that threatens irreparable injury, while the re-
spondent asserts that he is not engaging in the conduct charged or that the
conduct charged is not unlawful and that granting relief will harm the respon-
dent at least as much as a denial would harm the complainant, courts of equity
have concluded that if the complaint makes a prima facie case of illegality and
irreparable injury and if it convinces the court that a grant of relief will hurt
the respondent less than a denial would hurt the petitioner, the temporary
relief should be granted and the case set for trial as soon as possible. All
courts have agreed that the mission of equity can be served only in this way. 179
179. The views on equity principle of all Anglo-American judges, North and South, in En-
gland and America, including federal judges, have come to be indistinguishable, although, as
ensuing footnotes show, there is the usual difficulty in aligning their practices. The single most
instructive United States case on equity principle that I have encountered is Salmon v. Clagett, 3
Bland 125 (Md. 1828). For representative United States cases, most of them not involving labor
disputes, but selected largely from the period of "government by injunction" (1880-1932) in order
to establish the general equity background of the labor injunction, see Machinists v. Gonzales, 356
U.S. 617, 621 (1958) (cited here for its statement by J. Frankfurter, the most strenuous of the
crusaders against government by injunction, that the U.S. Supreme Court should not "mutilate
the comprehensive relief of equity"); Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co. v. Rowe, 245 U.S. 275 (1917); Mc-
Lean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877); Associated Press v. International News Serv., 245 F. 244 (2d
Cir. 1917), aft'd, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); American Malting Co. v. Keitel, 209 F. 351 (2d Cir. 1913);
Sailors' Union v. Hammond Lumber Co., 156 F. 450 (9th Cir. 1907); Irving v. Joint Dist. Council,
United Bhd. of Carpenters, 180 F. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1910); Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Goldfield
Miners' Union 220, 159 F. 500 (D. Nev. 1908); Otis Steel Co. v. Local 218, Iron Molders' Union,
110 F. 698 (N.D. Ohio 1901); Coe & Milsom v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 3 F. 775 (M.D. Tenn.
1880); J.F. Parkinson Co. v. Building Trade Council of Santa Clara County, 154 Cal. 581, 98 P.
1027 (1908); Vincent v. Chicago & A. Ry., 49 IM. 33 (1868); Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N.J. Eq.
910, 67 A. 97 (1907); Wheelock v. Noonan, 108 N.Y. 179 (1888); Finnegan v. Butler, 112 Misc.
280, 182 N.Y.S. 671 (1920); Sultan v. Star Co., 106 Misc. 43, 174 N.Y.S. 52 (1919); Lawrence v.
Lawrence, 172 N.Y.S. 146 (1918). For an excellent treatise on the development of equity, see G.
SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY (1846-1850) (2 vols.); see
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To withhold relief until the legal and factual issues are fully tried would con-
stitute an abandonment of some of the most valuable features of equitable
remedies.
Centuries of development in equity principle have been summed up re-
cently in a masterly way by Lord Diplock. In a case having nothing to do with
labor relations or labor disputes, he said:
My Lords, when an application for an interlocutory injunction
to restrain a defendant from doing acts alleged to be in violation of
the plaintiffs legal right is made upon contested facts, the decision
whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at
a time when ex hypothesi the existence of the right or the violation of
it, or both, is uncertain and will remain uncertain until final judg-
ment is given in the action. It was to mitigate the risk of injustice to
the plaintiff during the period before that uncertainty could be re-
solved that the practice arose of granting him relief by way of inter-
locutory injunction; but since the middle of the 19th century this has
been made subject to his undertaking to pay damages to the defend-
ant for any loss suffered by reason of the injunction if it should be
held at the trial that the plaintiff had not been entitled to restrain the
defendant from doing what he was threatening to do. The object of
the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury
by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately com-
pensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were
resolved in his favour at the trial; but the plaintiffs need for such
also C. HUSTON, THE ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES IN EQUITY (1915); F. MAITLAND, EQUITY (2d
ed. 1936); R. NEwMAN, EQUITY AND LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1961).
For representative cases indicating that southern judges shared the understanding of equity
principle reflected in the foregoing decisions of their northern colleagues, see Klibanoff v. Tri-
Cities Retail Clerks' Local 1678, 258 Ala. 479, 64 So. 2d 393 (1953); Montgomery Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 256 Ala. 678, 53 So. 2d 112, cert. dismissed, 344 U.S.
178 (1952); Local 57, Bhd. of Painters, v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 16 So. 2d 705 (1944); Shaup v.
International Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 228 Ala. 202, 135 So. 327 (1931); Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co.
v. Cruse, 189 Ala. 66, 66 So. 657 (1914); Harper v. Hoecherl, 153 Fla. 29, 14 So. 2d 179 (1943);
Hanton v. Harris, 152 Fla. 736, 13 So. 2d 17 (1943); Ellis v. Parks, 212 Ga. 540, 93 S.E.2d 708
(1956); Robinson v. Bryant, 181 Ga. 722, 184 S.E. 298 (1936); Edrington v. Hall, 168 Ga. 484, 148
S.E. 403 (1929); Holmes v. Brown, 146 Ga. 402, 91 S.E. 408 (1917); Godchaux Sugars, Inc. v.
Chaisson, 227 La. 146,78 So. 2d 673, vacatedas moot sub nom., Chaisson v. Southcoast Corp., 350
U.S. 899 (1955); Baton Rouge Bldg. Trades Council v. James & Co., 201 La. 749, 10 So. 2d 606
(1942); Local 1226, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Ross, 180 La. 293, 156 So. 357 (1934); Keegan v.
Board of Comm'rs, 154 La. 639, 98 So. 50 (1923); Local 76, Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v.
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 143 La. 901, 79 So. 532 (1918); Twiggs v. Barbers Local 496,
57 So. 2d 803 (La. App.), cert. denied, 58 So. 2d 298 (La. 1952); Cain, Brogden & Cain, Inc. v.
Local 47, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 155 Tex. 304, 285 S.W.2d 942 (1956); Office Employees Local
129 v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 314 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Lundme v. McKin-
ney, 183 S.W.2d 265 (Trex. Civ. App. 1944); Watson v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R., 173 S.W.2d 357
(rex. Civ. App. 1943); Borden Co. v. Local 133, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 152 S.W.2d 828 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941); Carpenters Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 149 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941),
ai'd, 315 U.S. 722 (1942); Photo-Engravers' No. 38 v. Lemmon, 148 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941); Carter v. Bradshaw, 138 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Price, 126 S.W.2d 74 (rex. Civ. App. 1939); Grand Int'l Bhd. of Loc. Engrs v. Marshall, 119
S.W.2d 908 (rex. Civ. App. 1938); Gurtov v. Williams, 105 S.W.2d 328 (rex. Civ. App. 1937);
Longshoremen's Local 329 v. Williams, 102 S.W.2d 1072 (rex. Civ. App. 1937); Thomas v. Inter-
national Seamen's Union, 101 S.W.2d 328 (rex. Civ. App. 1937); Sheehan v. Levy, 238 S.W. 900
(rex. App. Comm'n 1922).
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protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the
defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having
been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he
could not be adequately compensated under the plaintiff's undertak-
ing in damages if the uncertainty were resolved in the defendant's
favour at the trial. The court must weigh one need against another
and determine where "the balance of convenience" lies.
In those cases where the legal rights of the parties depend upon
facts that are in dispute between them, the evidence available to the
court at the hearing of the application for an interlocutory injunction
is incomplete. It is given on affidavit and has not been tested by oral
cross-examination. The purpose sought to be achieved by giving to
the court discretion to grant such injunctions would be stultified if
the discretion were clogged by a technical rule forbidding its exercise
if upon that incomplete untested evidence the court evaluated the
chances of the plaintiff's ultimate success in the action at 50 per cent,
or less, but permitting its exercise if the court evaluated his chances
at more than 50 per cent.180
180. American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] A.C. 396, 406. There is so much valua-
ble material in Lord Diplock's opinion that I quote him further at length:
It is no part of the court's function at this stage of the litigation to try to resolve
conflicts of evidence on affidavit as to facts on which the claims of either party may
ultimately depend nor to decide difficult questions of law which call for detailed argu-
ment and mature considerations. These are matters to be dealt with at the trial. One of
the reasons for the introduction of the practice of requiring an undertaking as to dam-
ages upon the grant of an interlocutory injunction was that "it aided the court in doing
that which was its great object, viz. abstaining from expressing any opinion upon the
merits of the case until the hearing." Wakefield v. Duke of Buccleugh (1865) 12 L.T. 628,
629. So unless the material available to the court at the hearing of the application for an
interlocutory injunction fails to disclose that the plaintiff has any real prospect of suc-
ceeding in his claim for a permanent injunction at the trial, the court should go on to
consider whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting or refusing the
interlocutory relief that is sought.
As to that, the governing principle is that the court should first consider whether, if
the plaintiff were to succeed at the trial in establishing his right to a permanent injunc-
tion, he would be adequately compensated by an award of damages for the the loss he
would have sustained as a result of the defendant's continuing to do what was sought to
be enjoined between the time of the application and the time of the trial. If damages in
the measure recoverable at common law would be adequate remedy and the defendant
would be in a financial position to pay them, no interlocutory injunction should nor-
mally be granted, however strong the plaintiffs claim appeared to be at that stage. If, on
the other hand, damages would not provide an adequate remedy for the plaintiff in the
event of his succeeding at the trial, the court should then consider whether, on the con-
trary hypothesis that the defendant were to succeed at the trial in establishing his right to
do that which was sought to be enjoined, he would be adequately compensated under the
plaintiff's undertaking as to damages for the loss he would have sustained by being pre-
vented from doing so between the time of the application and the time of the trial. If
damages in the measure recoverable under such an undertaking would be an adequate
remedy and the plaintiff would be in a financial position to pay them, there would be no
reason upon this ground to refuse an interlocutory injunction.
It is where there is doubt as to the adequacy of the respective remedies in damages
available to either party or to both, that the question of balance of convenience arises. It
would be unwise to attempt even to list all the various matters which may need to be
taken into consideration in deciding where the balance lies, let alone to suggest the rela-
tive weight to be attached to them. These will vary from case to case.
Where other factors appear to be evenly balanced it is a counsel of prudence to take
such measures as are calculated to preserve the status quo. If the defendant is enjoined
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Except in labor cases,' 81 modem equity practice has been tending more
and more to provide interlocutory relief when the plaintiff makes a prima facie
case, convinces the court that the balance of the equities is in its favor, puts up
an indemnity bond, and agrees to a speedy hearing on the issues.182 Current
equity practice is well illustrated by a preliminary injunction handed down
two years ago against the United States Auto Club (USAC). When in 1979
Johnny Rutherford and other racing drivers formed a competing association,
USAC excluded them from the Indianapolis 500. On suit by Rutherford and
his fellows, U.S. District Judge James Noland in Indianapolis issued a prelimi-
nary injunction against the exclusion just twenty days before the race. 18 3 No
opinion was filled with the decree, and none has been filed since. But accord-
ing to a newspaper report, Judge Noland said in court that while he was not
temporarily from doing someihing that he has not done before, the only effect of the
interlocutory injunction in the event of his succeeding at the trial is to postpone the date
at which he is able to embark upon a course of action which he has not previously found
it necessary to undertake; whereas to interrupt him in the conduct of an established en-
terprise would cause much greater inconvenience to him since he would have to start
again to establish it in the event of his succeeding at the trial.
Save in the simplest cases, the decision to grant or to refuse an interlocutory injunc-
tion will cause to whichever party is unsuccessful on the application some disadvantages
which his ultimate success at the trial may show he ought to have been spared and the
disadvantages may be such that the recovery of damages to which he would then be
entitled either in the action or under the plaintiffs undertaking would not be sufficient to
compensate him fully for all of them. The extent to which the disadvantages to each
party would be incapable of being compensated in damages in the event of his suc-
ceeding at the trial is always a significant factor in assessing where the balance of con-
venience lies; and if the extent of uncompensatable [sic] disadvantage to each party
would not differ widely, it may not be improper to take into account in tipping the bal-
ance the relative strength of each party's case as revealed by the affidavit evidence ad-
duced on the hearing of the application. This, however, should be done only where it is
apparent upon the facts disclosed by evidence as to which there is no credible dispute
that the strength of one party's case is disproportionate to that of the other party. The
court is notjustpfed in embarking upon anything resembling a trial of the action upon con-flicting affidavits in order to evaluate the strength of either party's case.
Id. at 407-09 (emphasis added). For other instructive English cases, see Hubbard v. Pitt, [1975] 1
All E.R. 1056, 1069-70 (Q.B.D.), af'd [1975] 3 All E.R. 1 (C.A.); J. Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins,
[1896] 1 Ch. 811, 827; Newton v. Amalgamated Musicians' Union, 12 T.L.R. 623 (Ch. 1896);
Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 15 Q.B.D. 476, 484-86 (1885), a#'d [1892] A.C. 25;
Aslatt v. Corporation of Southampton, 16 Ch. D. 143 (1880); Goodson v. Richardson, L.R. 9 Ch.
221 (Ch. App. 1874); Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L.R. 6 Eq. 551 (1868); Knott v. Morgan, 2
Keen 213, 48 Eng. Rep. 610 (M.R. 1836); Lowndes v. Bettle, 3 New Reports 409, 33 L.J. Ch. 451,
10 Jur. N.S. 226 (1814).
181. As emphasized throughout this and the first installment of this Article, the combination
of the preemption doctrine and state and federal anti-injunction legislation has privileged unions
to inflict irreparable injury in ways denied to all other members of society. Section 7 of the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976), works an abortion of equity by placing an absolute
limit of five days on temporary restraining orders, no matter how egregious the union conduct
restrained, and by requiring, prior to the issuance of a preliminary injunction, proof so onerous
that the irreparable injury equity was designed to preclude is bound to occur.
182. For some interesting recent articles on current equity practice and procedure see Ham-
mond, Interlocutory Injunctions: Timefor a New Model?, 30 U. TORoNTo L.J. 240 (1980) (pro-
poses modification of Lord Diplock's concept); Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary
Injunctions, 91 HARv. L. REv. 525 (1978) (arguing for minimization of probable irreparable loss
of rights from preliminary injunctions); Note, Probability of Ultimate Success Held Unnecessaryfor
Grant ofInterlocutory Injunction, 71 COLUM. L. RE,. 165 (1971).
183. Rutherford v. United States Auto Club, Inc., No. I.P. 79-360-C (S.D. Ind., filed May 11,
1979).
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sure that the complainants would ultimately prevail on their charge that
USAC violated the antitrust laws, the balance of the equities was so clearly in
their favor that temporary relief had to be granted. 184 On the one hand no
legal remedy could possibly compensate complainants for the loss of their
chance to compete in the Indianapolis 500, the most lucrative and famous race
in America; on the other hand, respondent USAC could not demonstrate any
pecuniary loss at all tracing to the grant of relief.
It is true, as unionists complain about interlocutory relief in labor cases,
that the preliminary injunction in the USAC case put an end to the litigation.
USAC was not likely to want a hearing after the race; probably it would rather
not have had its status under the antitrust laws adjudicated. And the com-
plainants got all they wanted at the time-a chance to compete. But there is
nothing new or astonishing in the fact that interlocutory decrees will often end
a dispute.'8 5 This possibility of a quick ending to a dispute may even be bene-
ficial. Equity's way is often the cheapest and least painful way, even for the
defendant. It may cost much less than a long, drawn-out damages action.
Moreover, in labor disputes, at any rate, effective injunctive relief may prevent
bloodshed.'8 6 By the turn of the century, judges all over the country, more
perhaps in the North than in the South, had begun to realize that equitable
remedies might be as salutary and as promising in labor disputes as they were
in other disputes.187
2. Equity Principle in the Labor Cases, North and South
On the whole, the equity principles applicable to disputes in general have
also been applied (to the extent that the preemption doctrine and anti-injunc-
tion legislation permit), at least abstractly speaking, to labor disputes. I say
"abstractly" because, contrary to common belief, all courts have tended in
practice to apply equity principle in a manner far more favorable to unions
than they have to other defendants in suits for injunctive relief.
At least in the North in earlier days, employers could count on interlocu-
tory relief in labor disputes much as they could in other kinds of disputes. As
elsewhere, they needed to establish a prima facie case of illegality, the absence
of any adequate legal remedy for the kind of harm that the unionists were
doing or threatening, and a favorable balance of the equities as it appeared
from the relative hardship test.' 8 8 To typical union denials of any wrongdo-
184. Winston-Salem Journal, May 6, 1979, at D 1.
185. See W. JONES, THE ELIZABETHAN COURT OF CHANCERY 286-87 (1967), an extremely
valuable piece of original research.
186. For example, an injunction might have prevented a riot in State v. Hoffman, 199 N.C.
328, 154 S.E. 314 (1930).
187. See C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 95-97 (rev. ed. 1949); S. PETRO, THE LABOR
POLICY OF THE FREE SOCIETY 272-89 (1957).
188. Eg., Cathey v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 228 F. 26 (4th Cir. 1915); Charleston Dry Dock &
Mach. Co. v. O'Rourke, 274 F. 811 (E.D.S.C. 1921); Employers' Teaming Co. v. Teamsters' Joint
Council, 141 F. 679 (C.C.N.D. I1M. 1905) rev'dsub nom. Garrigan v. United States, 163 F. 16 (7th
Cir. 1908), cert. denied, 214 U.S. 514 (1909); Gulf Bag Co. v. Suttner, 124 F. 467 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1903); Otis Steel Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 110 F. 698 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1901); United States v.
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ing, many northern courts, especially federal courts, and many New York
judges, would respond that an injunction confined to unlawful conduct could
not hurt defendants who swore that they were not engaging in such con-
duct. 189 These courts understood that withholding injunctive relief merely be-
cause the defendant denied the plaintiff's allegations of fact and law would put
an end to equitable remedies in labor disputes. For if relief were denied pend-
ing a full trial of the issues, the irreparable injury that equity might have pre-
vented would occur. Despite early success with the labor injunction, however,
it did not take employers long to realize that they would have to cope with
union aggression some other way; the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
in 1932 virtually abolished temporary relief in labor disputes in the federal
Workingmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 F. 994 (C.C.E.D. La.), aft'd, 57 F. 85 (5th Cir. 1893);
Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, 45 F. 135 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1891). But see Union Pac.
R.R. v. Ruef, 120 F. 102 (C.C.D. Neb. 1902) (denying that a restraint only of illegal conduct
cannot hurtdefendants); Goldberg, Bowen & Co. v. Stablemen's Local 8760, 149 Cal. 429, 86 P.
806 (1906); My Maryland Lodge 186, IAM v. Adt, 100 Md. 238, 59 A. 721 (1905); Hamilton-
Brown Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 131 Mo. 212,32 S.W. 1106 (1895); Gevas v. Greek Restaurant Workers'
Club, 99 N.J. Eq. 770, 134 A. 309 (1926); Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N.J. Eq. 759, 53
A. 230 (1902); J.H. & S. Theatres, Inc. v. Fay, 260 N.Y. 315, 183 N.E. 509, rev;- 236 A.D. 744,258
N.Y.S. 993 (1932); Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307, 174 N.E. 690 (1931), modfying 228 A.D. 856,
241 N.Y.S. 832 (1930); Rentner v. Sigman, 216 A.D. 407, 215 N.Y.S. 323, rev g 126 Misc. 781, 216
N.Y.S. 79 (1926) (extending the trial court's limit of six pickets to all picketing); Yablonowitz v.
Korn, 205 A.D. 440, 199 N.Y.S. 769 (1923); Altman v. Schlesinger, 204 A.D. 513, 198 N.Y.S. 128
(1923); Marks Arnheim, Inc. v. Hillman, 198 A.D. 88, 189 N.Y.S. 369 (1921); Wyckoff Amusement
Co. v. Kaplan, 183 A.D. 205, 170 N.Y.S. 548 (1918); Master Horseshoers' Protective Ass'n v.
Quinlivan, 83 A.D. 459, 82 N.Y.S. 288 (1903); Herzog v. Fitzgerald, 74 A.D. 110, 77 N.Y.S. 366
(1902); Davis v. Rosenstein, 56 A.D. 220, 67 N.Y.S. 629 (1900); Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v.
Delaney, 48 A.D. 623, 62 N.Y.S. 750 (1900); Davis v. Zimmerman, 91 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 489, 36
N.Y.S. 303 (1895) (the first injunction issued in New York in a labor dispute; follows general
equity practice, making no exception for union aggression); Skolny v. Hillman, 114 Misc. 571, 187
N.Y.S. 706, affl'dmem, 198 A.D. 941, 189 N.Y.S. 955 (1921).
The following trial court decisions indicate that a large number of New York judges, quite
possibly a majority, felt that no exception to general equity principles should be made in labor
disputes. Thus "liberal" New York may have been more "conservative" (and even more "anti-
union") than the allegedly "conservative" southern judges: Engelking v. Independent Wet Wash
Co., 142 Misc. 510, 254 N.Y.S. 87 (1931) (breach of contract by employer enjoined despite deni-
als); Liebowitz v. Bronx Shoe Salesmen, N.Y.L.J. (Apr. 1, 1927); Greenfield v. Schachtman,
N.Y.L.J. (May 20, 1926); Federal Slipper Co v. Roth, N.Y.L.J. (May 21, 1926); Leeds v. Lewis,
N.Y.L.J. (June 25, 1925); Bart v. Markowitz, N.Y.L.J. (Dec. 30, 1924); Russell v. Obermeier,
N.Y.L.J. (May 10, 1924); Yates Hotel Co. v. Meyers, 195 N.Y.S. 558 (1922); Schlesinger v. Quinto,
117 Misc. 735, 192 N.Y.S. 564, aif'd, 201 A.D. 487, 194 N.Y.S. 401 (1922) (Justice Wagner en-joined employer breach of collective agreement despite doubts of validity of agreement); Schlang
v. Ladies' Waist Makers' Union, 67 Misc. 221,-, 124 N.Y.S. 289, 290 (1910) (a somewhat contra-
dictory decision in which the judge stated that union denials do not provide injunctive relief but
then proceeded to respect the denials). Compare Segenfeld v. Friedman, 117 Misc. 731, 193
N.Y.S. 128 (1922) (Justice Wagner denied injunctive relief against violence by unionists when
union denied responsibility; perhaps it all depended, with the author of the Wagner Act, on whose
ox was gored); United Traction Co. v. Droogan, 115 Misc. 672, 189 N.Y.S. 39 (1921); Schwartz &
Jaffee, Inc. v. Hillman, 115 Misc. 61, 189 N.Y.S. 21 (1921); Pre' Catelan, Inc. v. International
Fed'n of Workers, 114 Misc. 662, 188 N.Y.S. 29 (1921); Michaels v. Hillman, 111 Misc. 284, 181
N.Y.S. 165,permanent injunction & damages awarded, 112 Misc. 395, 183 N.Y.S. 195 (1920) (Felix
Frankfurter was of counsel to Sidney Hillman in this case, a fact that may help to explain the
strong stand against injunctions taken ten years later in his book, F. FRANKFURTER & N.
GREENE, supra note 134); New York Cent. Iron Works Co. v. Brennan, 105 N.Y.S. 865 (Sup. Ct.
1907); W.P. Davis Mach. Co. v. Robinson, 41 Misc. 329, 84 N.Y.S. 837 (1903); Foster v. Retail
Clerks' Int'l, 39 Misc. 48, 78 N.Y.S. 860 (1902).
189. Most of the decisions cited in the foregoing note made this point, although in some in.
stances implicitly. See, e.g., Altman v. Schlesinger, 204 A.D. 513, 198 N.Y.S. 128, 132 (1923).
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courts, and the United States Supreme Court's preemption doctrine has ac-
complished a similar function in the state courts, except for cases of blatant
violence.190
The application of general equity principle to labor disputes was less clear
in the South than in the North, owing in part to the scarcity of thoughtful and
thorough discussion of equitable remedies in the southern labor-injunction
cases. Perusal of the cases reveals not a single one in which thepure doctrine
of temporary equitable relief is stated, at least not with any great power. That
is, no southern court seems to have said that once a prima facie case of illegal
conduct and irreparable injury is made, the complainant may dispense entirely
with proof that the unlawful conduct is actually occurring. Likewise, few if
any southern courts said, as northern judges did so often, that if the union
denied the allegations of unlawful conduct it could scarcely complain of an
injunction specifically and narrowly addressed to the conduct denied. If the
reader inspects the cases cited to this paragraph, he or she will see practically
every southern court taking a close look at the evidence before affirming tem-
porary relief. This has been especially true of the North Carolina courts, but
the other southern cases do not differ greatly. They may deny the necessity of
full proof of the facts when a prima facie case is made, but they nevertheless
examine the facts closely in reviewing the decrees.191
The foregoing discussion has been confined to the courts that seem to
have accepted the prima-facie-case principle of temporary, interlocutory relief.
While no court to my knowledge has explicitly rejected this principle, many,
North and South, have done so in fact. The worst offenders have been some of
the New York courts.1 92 While many New York judges followed the normal
190. See note 181 supra.
191. Wood, Wire, & Metal Lathers Local 216 v. Brown & Root, Inc., 258 Ala. 430, 63 So. 2d
372 (1953); Smith v. F&C Engineering Co., 285 S.W.2d 100 (Ark. 1955); Self v. Taylor, 217 Ark.
953, 235 S.W.2d 45 (1950),petition to vacate injunction denied, 224 Ark. 524, 275 S.W.2d 21 (1955);
Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 858 v. Jiannas, 211 Ark. 352, 200 S.W.2d 736 (1947); Riggs
v. Tucker Duck & Rubber Co., 196 Ark. 571, 119 S.W.2d 507 (1938); Jones v. State, 170 Ark. 863,
281 S.W. 663 (1926); Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Alliance v. Stathakis, 135 Ark. 86, 205
S.W. 450 (1918); Ormerod v. Typographical Union, 1 Fla. Supp. 79 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1951), aj'd, 61
So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1952); Fleming v. Terminal Transp. Co., 222 Ga. 583, 151 S.E.2d 137 (1966);
Construction & Gen. Laborers' Local 438 v. Curry, 217 Ga. 512, 123 S.E.2d 653 (1962), rev'd, 371
U.S. 542 (1963); Jones v. Van Winkle Gin & Mach. Works, 131 Ga. 336, 62 S.E. 236 (1908);
Citizens Co. v. Asheville Typographical Union No. 263, 187 N.C. 42, 121 S.E. 31 (1924); McGin-
nis v. Raleigh Typographical Union, No. 54, 182 N.C. 770, 108 S.E. 728 (1921).
The Texas courts came closest to the general view that at the preliminary-injunction stage
only a prima facie case was necessary and that factual denials should not preclude relief. See
Truck Drivers Local 941 v. Whitfield Transp., Inc., 154 Tex. 91, 273 S.W.2d 857 (1954); Texas
Foundaries, [sic] Inc. v. International Moulders Union, 151 Tex. 239, 248 S.W.2d 460 (1952);
Texas State Fed'n of Labor v. Brown & Root, 246 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); General
Drivers Local 745 v. Oak Cliff Baking Co., 203 S.W.2d 586 (rex. Civ. App. 1947); Watson v.
Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R., 173 S.W.2d 357 (rex. Civ. App. 1943); Henke & Pillot, Inc. v. Meat Cut-
ters No. 408, 109 S.W.2d 1083 (rex. Civ. App. 1937) (injunction denied to one party, granted to
another); Harper v. Local 520, IBEW, 48 S.W.2d 1033 (rex. Civ. App. 1932); Webb v. Cooks' No.
748, 205 S.W. 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); Underwood v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 178 S.W. 38 (rex. Civ.
App. 1915). However, as in New York, there were some Texas courts that allowed factual denials
to preclude interlocutory relief. See note 195 infra.
192. One of the worst was Justice Wagner, who was to have the original National Labor Rela-
tions Act named after him. Compare Schlesinger v. Quinto, 117 Misc. 735, 192 N.Y.S. 564, aft'd,
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practice of issuing or affirming temporary relief, despite union denials, when a
prima facie case of illegality was made, 193 other New York judges withheld
relief or reversed grants of relief, on the ground that the complainant did not
adequately prove that the conduct alleged was occurring.1 94
Throughout the South, as in the North, adherence to basic equity princi-
ple was spotty in labor cases. While southern courts tended to require consid-
erable evidence of illegal conduct before they would enjoin or affirm
injunctions against union action in labor disputes, even while saying that only
a prima facie case was needed, many of the southern judges went considerably
further in denying relief, or in reversing grants of relief. Never did they say
that as much proof is required to get a preliminary injunction as there is to get
a permanent injunction, but they often seemed-implicitly to expect as much.19s
In doing the research for this Article it occurred to me that something
might be learned about judicial attitudes in the South by carefully examining
the way in which appellate judges reviewed the findings and conclusions of
trial judges in labor-injunction cases. Here too, however, nothing very en-
lightening or surprising turned up. Like their northern colleagues, 196 southern
appellate judges took the usual position that the factfmdings and orders of trial
201 A.D. 487, 194 N.Y.S. 401 (1922) (employer breach of collective agreement enjoined despite
doubts of validity of agreement) with Segenfeld v. Friedman, 117 Misc. 731, 193 N.Y.S. 128 (1922)
(injunctive relief against violence by unionists denied when union claimed no responsibility).
193. See cases cited in note 188 supra.
194. Many New York decisions seem to have rejected in fact, if not in principle, the idea that
interlocutory relief should be granted on a prima facie case of illegality and relative hardship. See,
e.g., Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 220 A.D. 830, 222 N.Y.S. 825 (1927), rev'd, 247
N.Y. 65, 159 N.E. 863 (1928); Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rilkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157
N.E. 130 (1927); Piermont v. Schlesinger, 196 A.D. 658, 188 N.Y.S. 35 (1921); Mills v. United
States Printing Co., 99 A.D. 605, 91 N.Y.S. 185 (1904); Levy v. Rosenstein, 66 N.Y.S. 101, ar'd, 56
A.D. 618, 67 N.Y.S. 630 (1900); Kerbs v. Rosenstein, 31 Misc. 661, 66 N.Y.S. 42, aftd, 56 A.D.
619, 67 N.Y.S. 385 (1900); Palace Knitwear, Inc. v. Knitgoods Workers' Union, 19 Lab. Cas.
66304 (1951); Feldstein v. International Pocketbook Workers, N.Y.L.J. (Aug. 2, 1928); Manker v.
Bakers' Local 144,220 Misc. 516,221 N.Y.S. 106 (1927); Post & McCord v. Morrin, N.Y.L.J. (July
25, 1924); Albee & Godfrey Co. v. Arci, 201 N.Y.S. 172 (1923) (when allegations were denied,
court held that complainant must win a criminal prosecution before interlocutory relief possiblel);
Friedman v. Menendez, N.Y.L.J. (Jan. 20, 1923); Segenfeld v. Friedman, 117 Misc. 731, 193
N.Y.S. 128 (1922); Gilwyne Costume Co., Inc. v. Schlesinger, 4 Law & Lab. 168, N.Y.L.J. (May
22, 1922); Wood Mowing & Reaping Mach. Co. v. Toohey, 114 Misc. 185, 186 N.Y.S. 95 (1921);
Schiang v. Ladies' Waist Makers' Local 25, 67 Misc. 221, 124 N.Y.S. 289 (1910) (although court
stated that equity will enjoin admittedly unlawful acts, relief denied for lack of adequate proof).
For other instances of judicial acceptance of the idea that denials should preclude interlocu-
tory relief, see Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 F. 102, 116 (C.C.D. Neb. 1902); Rissler v. Plumbers'
Local 326, 109 N.J. Eq. 91, 93-94, 156 A. 498, 499 (1931); Keuffel & Esser v. Machinists, 93 N.J.
Eq. 429, 439-45, 116 A. 9, 13-15 (1922) (Minturn, J., dissenting).
195. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Alliance v. Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265, 30 So. 2d 696
(1947), contempt proceedings dismissed sub. non Exparte Hacker, 250 Ala. 64, 33 So. 2d 324
(1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948); Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 156 v. Cothron, 59
So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1952); Johnson v. White Swan Laundry, 41 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1949); Moore v. City
Dry Cleaners & Laundry, Inc., 41 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1949); Henderson v. Coleman, 150 Fla. 185, 7
So. 2d 117 (1942); Weissman v. Jureit, 132 Fla. 661, 181 So. 898 (Fla. 1938); Millwrights Local
2484 v. Rust Eng'r Co., 433 S.W.2d 683 (rex. 1968); Truck Drivers Local 941 v. Whitfield Transp.,
Inc., 154 Tex. 91, 273 S.W.2d 857 (1954); Exparte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335, 220 S.W. 75 (1920); The
Fair, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 131, 157 S.W.2d 716 (rex. Civ. App. 1941); Tipton v. Hotel
Employees Local 808, 149 S.W.2d 1028 (rex. Civ. App. 1941); ILGWU Local 123 v. Dorothy
Frocks Co., 95 S.W.2d 1346 (rex. Civ. App. 1936).
196. The outstanding case of reluctant appeals-court acceptance of a trial court's decision (to
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judges should not be disturbed in the absence of a mistake of law, an abuse of
discretion, or a gross misreading of the evidence.1 97 In a majority of the cases,
as we have seen, the decisions of the trial courts were affirmed.198 The only
exceptions were in Florida1 99 and Texas,2°° where in certain cases there were a
disproportionate number of reversals. In both states, however, the reversals
favored union defendants. If this suggests an anti-union set in the trial judges,
it also suggests a pro-union set in Florida and Texas appellate judges.
The single most important fact about the labor-injunction cases in the
South, as in the North, is that they all reflect a tendency in the judges to use
injunctive relief much more sparingly against unions than against defendants
in other equity cases. If the principles stated by Lord Diplock in the American
Cyanamid case and by Federal Judge Noland in the Rutherford case were
applied without modification in the typical labor case, injunctive relief would
never be denied against coercive union action. Either by the common law or
by statutes, all coercive union action is prima facie unlawful (or actionable). 201
Furthermore, in every case of coercive union conduct the harm to employers
and to nonunion or anti-union employees ensuing from a denial of relief is
immeasurably greater than the harm to unions ensuing from a grant. While
unions lose nothing that the law is designed to protect when they are enjoined
from coercive action, when there is even the slightest delay in granting injunc-
tive relief employers and nonunion or anti-union employees suffer severe
damage of the type the law is designed to prevent or discourage.
This is not to say that injunctions are always one hundred percent effec-
tive in labor disputes. But they are the best remedial and protective measures
that the legal system has as yet produced. The severe impairment of the avail-
ability of injunctive relief in labor disputes, North and South, created by anti-
injunction laws and the preemption doctrine thus amounts to a national catas-
trophe. The charge that southern judges are anti-union, clearly unsupported
by the cases, pales into insignificance against this fact.
D. Contempt in the Southern Labor Injunction Cases
The preceding sections of this Article, like the first installment, all reveal
that the southern courts have been at least as indulgent toward union conduct
as the most "liberal" northern courts have been, and markedly more indulgent
than the "conservative" northern courts have been. It would therefore have
been surprising to find the southern courts stricter in contempt cases, and the
cases spare us any such surprise. The indulgent attitude of the southern courts
enjoin all picketing because it was enmeshed in violence) was probably Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y.
307, 174 N.E. 690 (1931).
197. Cain, Brogden & Cain, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 47, 155 Tex. 304,
285 S.W.2d 942 (1956).
198. See notes 132-54 and accompanying text supra.
199. See notes 25-27, 85-87 and accompanying text supra; see also Table 1 infra.
200. See notes 46-52, 64-72, 109-16 and accompanying text supra; see also Table 1 infra.
201. The substantive-law basis of the labor injunction is developed at length in Part III of this
Article, to be published in volume 60 of this Review.
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toward unions continues in the contempt cases, even those in which union
defendants blatantly defied the decrees that the southern courts finally is-
sued.20 2
The normal rule in this country is that collateral attacks upon injunctions
are not permitted in contempt proceedings. Even void orders must be
obeyed.203 Although this rule is followed in some southern states,2°4 in sev-
eral southern states the courts permit collateral attacks.205 Perhaps this is an-
other reason for the disrespect so frequently shown southern decrees. 206
Respect for southern labor injunctions is not encouraged, either, by those
judges who believe that they inhibit picket-line coercion by "limiting" the
number of pickets to twenty-five.207 Of course, contumacious unionists have
often been found in contempt by southern judges, usually after conscientious
trials.208 But one wonders how significant such findings are when penalties for
contempt are limited by law to seventy-two h6urs imprisonment and one hun-
dred dollars, as they are in Texas.2 0 9
202. Derisive disregard of North Carolina and Tennessee injunctions is a constant theme in D.
MCCRACKEN, supra note 41, e.g. at 107-13, 121-30, 173-86.
203. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); 250 Ala. 64, 33 So. 2d 324
(1947).
204. E.g., Georgia. See, e.g., Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Odom, 193 Ga. 471, 18 S.E.2d 841
(1942).
205. See Exparte Hacker, 250 Ala. 64, 33 So. 2d 324 (1947). See also Exparte George, 371
U.S. 72 (1973) (per curiam), vacating and remanding 163 Tex. 103, 358 S.W.2d 590 (1962), decision
on remand, 364 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1963) (defendant discharged); Exparte Dilley, 160 Tex. 522, 334
S.W.2d 425 (1960); Exparte Twedell, 158 Tex. 214, 309 S.W.2d 834 (1958); Exparte Henry, 147
Tex. 315, 215 S.W.2d 588 (1948); Exparte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335, 220 S.W. 75 (1920). The virtual
equivalents of collateral attack have been allowed in North Carolina, Carolina Freight Carriers
Corp. v. Teamsters Local 61, 11 N.C. App. 159, 180 S.E.2d 461, cert. denied, 278 N.C. 701, 181
S.E.2d 602 (1971); and Tennessee, American Glanzstoff Corp. v. Miller (renn. Ch. 1929) (re-
viewed in D. MCCRACKEN, supra note 41, at 94-113) (no further citation available). hBut see Nash-
ville Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 187 Tenn. 444, 215 S.W.2d 818 (1948), in which the Tennessee
court held collateral attack impermissible.
206.. See D. McCRACKEN, supra note 41, at 107-13, 121-30, 173-86; see also Blue Jeans Corp.
v. Clothing Workers, 275 N.C. 503, 169 S.E.2d 867 (1969); Harriet Cotton Mills v. Local 578,
Textile Workers Union, 251 N.C. 218, 231, 248, 413, 111 S.E.2d 457, 465, 467, 529 (1959) (numer-
ous rulings tracing to same facts); Henderson Cotton Mills v. Local 584, Textile Workers Union,
251 N.C. 234, 240, 254, 335, 419, 111 S.E.2d 476, 471, 480, 484, 526 (1959) (numerous rulings in
same case); Carolina Wood Turning Co. v. Wiggins, 247 N.C. 115, 100 S.E.2d 218 (1957); Glen-
dale Mfg. Co. v. Bonano, 242 N.C. 587, 590, 89 S.E.2d 115, 116 (1955) (two decisions in single
contempt proceeding); Erwin Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union, 235 N.C. 107, 68 S.E.2d 813(1952); Royal Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 234 N.C. 545, 67 S.E.2d 755 (1951); Hart
Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Abrams, 231 N.C. 431, 57 S.E.2d 803 (1950); Safie Mfg. Co. v. Arnold, 228
N.C. 375, 45 S.E.2d 577 (1947); UptegraffMfg. Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 189, 20 N.C. App.
544, 202 S.E.2d 309, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 234 (1974); Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Local
161, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 11 N.C. App. 159, 180 S.E.2d 461, cert. denied, 278 N.C. 701, 181
S.E.2d 602 (1971).
207. E.g., Erwin Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union, 235 N.C. 107, 68 S.E.2d 813 (1952);
Hart Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Abrams, 231 N.C. 431, 57 S.E.2d 803 (1950).
208. See cases cited at note 206 supra.
209. Exparte Dilley, 160 Tex. 522, 334 S.W.2d 425 (1960). In North Carolina the maxima are
30 days and $250. See Blue Jeans Corp. v. Clothing Workers, 275 N.C. 503, 169 S.E.2d 867
(1969).
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III. FINAL CONCLUSIONS
In every area of law or legal administration examined in this and the
preceding installment, as well as in many other areas that have not been in-
cluded for lack of space, we have found the southern courts dealing at least as
gently with trade-union aggression as the most "liberal" northern courts ever
did, and far more gently than the "conservative" judges did in either the fed-
eral courts or the state courts of the more industrialized northern states. This
has been true with respect to both substantive-law rules and the even more
significant procedural doctrines and principles of the labor-injunction cases.
In the substantive-law areas of strikes, picketing, boycotts, compulsory
unionism, violence, and other tortious conduct, we have seen that the southern
courts largely adopted the views prevailing in the most "liberal" northern
state, New York. In my opinion, however, the most significant and revealing
comparison we have made is that of the practices of the southern courts and
the New York courts in the labor-injunction cases.
While a number of New York trial judges virtually negated equitable
remedies against coercive union conduct, an even greater number applied eq-
uitable principles as rigorously against union aggression as anyone could rea-
sonably desire. The same cannot accurately be said of any of the southern
decisions. None "laid down the law" as sternly to unions as a majority of New
York trial judges did. This, it seems to me, is the most remarkable fact turned
up in the present research. It alone should put forever to rest the belief that
"unions have done badly in the South" because of legal-institutional restraints
or anti-union bias in the southern courts.
The material in this installment has strengthened my conviction that
those who complain of institutional anti-unionism in the South have things
backwards. It is not true that unions have done badly in the South because of
institutional anti-unionism. The truth is, I believe, that the South did badly,
until recently, mainly because of its antibusiness, anticapitalist tendencies, of
which pro-unionism was one of the most significant manifestations.
Undoubtedly there were other reasons for the South's undeveloped condi-
tion until relatively late in this century. Lack of capital was of course the
generic deficiency. However, with the kind of capital investment that we see
being made in Taiwan and South Korea, one must wonder why capital did not
flow to our South earlier. The answer has to lie generally in deficient politico-
economic institutions. I believe that these Articles contribute a little to our
understanding of that deficiency.
Unions did not do badly in the South because of southern anti-unionism.
The South did badly in part because it was pro-union. The South dealt
slightly more firmly with unions after World War II, when unions had become
so powerful in the North that they were driving capital out of such states as
Massachusetts, which had become an industrial powerhouse earlier in the cen-
tury partly because of its vigorous judicial resistance to coercive, monopolistic
unionism. But when capital came to the South after World War II, it brought
along a firm intention to dispense with unions as far as possible.
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The most powerful specifics available to employers against unionism are
sound and humane personnel policies. The large companies have brought
such policies with them in their migration to the sun belt. These companies
have also developed relatively sophisticated communication techniques aimed
at convincing employees that the interests they have in common with their
employers far outweigh those in conflict. These policies and techniques have
at least raised doubts in the minds of southern employees over the desirability
of union representation. This is why union organizers do not have an easy
time "organizing" southern workers. Naturally they prefer to attribute their
lack of success to the alleged viciousness of employers. However, in view of
the National Labor Relations Act's heavy bias towards unions and against
employer resistance to unionism and the National Labor Relations Board's
rigorous stand against even the mildest kinds of employer coercion, these
union complaints will not be taken seriously by any informed person. Any-
way, if employees want unions they will have them, no matter how vigorously
employers resist.
Law enforcement in labor disputes may be improving in the South. By
this I mean that southern courts today may be less inclined to tolerate union
coercion than they used to be when the South was largely undeveloped. How-
ever, I do not mean to say that southern judges are requiring unionists to con-
duct themselves in the same peaceful and civilized manner required of most
other elements of society, especially businesses. Unions have acquired coer-
cive privileges denied to most others. In a well-run, civilized society, nothing
faintly resembling the coercion of picketing would be allowed, nor would mo-
nopolistic boycotts be tolerated. Furthermore, no social resources would be
spared in coping with violent union action. But obstructive picketing, monop-
olistic boycotts, and union violence go to a considerable extent unchecked in
many areas of the South (as they do in the North). Hence, while it may be true
that law enforcement in labor disputes is improving in the South, there is still
a long way to go. In any event, the idea that unions are doing badly in the
South because the law is weighted against them is simply laughable.
Since they have rejected free, productive competition as a means of gain-
ing their ends, American unionists, like many other monopolists, are driven
constantly to seek immunity for their aggressions. For them, the ideal state of
affairs exists when government prevents anyone from interfering with union
control of labor markets. If this requires the state on the one hand to bar
Japanese imports and on the other to provide special privileges and immuni-
ties to unions engaged in violently preventing fellow-Americans from working
during strikes, then that, according to unionists and their sympathizers, is the
way society ought to be arranged. When unionists complain that the dice are
loaded against them in the South, their lament really amounts to this: south-
ern courts should quit enforcing against unions the laws that apply to all
others. But if the materials collected and described in these Articles have any
meaning at all, they mean that American courts, North and South, are already
granting unions special privileges and immunities. That being the case, the
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laments must mean that unionists will not be content until they achieve a sta-
tus of total privilege.
The time is now probably past in this country when such a goal, largely
achieved by British trade unionists earlier in this century, is feasible. Hard
experience with unionists and relatively satisfactory experience with private
employers have produced a largely unfavorable opinion of trade unions in this
country. I expect that this opinion will grow. After all, unions produce noth-
ing in the best conditions, and when they enjoy special privileges they also
prevent others from producing. This is scarcely a way to endear oneself to a
country already suffering from low productivity.
Thus we emerge, finally, with some odd conclusions. We conclude first
that unionists are wrong in contending that they have done badly in the South
in thepast because of anti-union legal institutions. But our second conclusion
is that unionists over the next decade or so may be able to assert quite accu-
rately that they are doing badly in the South (and in the North) because they
are being made more and more to comply with the same code of civilized law
that other members of society must observe.
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TABLE 1















Ala. 0 0 0 1 1 4 0 1 1 1 1
Ark. 3 0 1 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 0
Fla. 1 1 I 1 0 3 1 7 3 2 1
Ga. 5 2 1 1 1 5 0 0 0 2 1
La. 1 1 2 3 0 2 0 1 2 0 I
Miss. 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 0
N.C. 0 3 1 0 10 0 1 3 1 0
S.C. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Tenn. 2 0 1 0 1 6 .1 1 2 0 1
Tex. 10 2 6 11 2 14 2 5 3 4 4
Va. 1 0 1 0 0 3 0 1 1 i 0
Totals 24 9 15 18 6 51 7 17 19 11 9
* That is, by lowest court in which injunction was sought. The succeeding divisions, "AlI'd," etc.,
indicate final disposition of the case on appeal, either to the intermediate appellate court or to the highest
court of the state. The preemption column contains decisions by state courts and the U.S. Supreme
Court, holding the state courts without jurisdiction in the particular case. In order to eliminate double
counting, the cases in the preemption column do not appear elsewhere, even though they usually involve
affirmance of an injunction granted below or a decision that an injunction should have been granted,
except for preemption.
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